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Per-District Basis
by RICHARD E. FINNERAN & STEVEN K. LUTHER*

In Gill v. Whitford, the Supreme Court dismissed a challenge to
Wisconsin’s state legislative map based upon a lack of standing. While the
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plaintiffs alleged that the statewide map violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution by being gerrymandered to asymmetrically
advantage one political party over the other, the Court held that such
allegations were insufficient to state a personal, individualized injury under
Article III’s Case or Controversy Clause. Since the plaintiffs had not alleged
that their voting power in their particular legislative districts had been
diluted, the Court found that the plaintiffs’ complaint stated only a
“generalized grievance” incapable of giving them standing under Article III.
The Supreme Court was likely correct to find the plaintiff’s proof was
incomplete, but that is only because the principal metric employed in the
case—the much-celebrated “efficiency gap”—is by definition capable of
identifying partisan bias only in a statewide map and not on a district-bydistrict basis. In this Article, we propose a methodology by which plaintiffs
can plausibly demonstrate the impact of partisan bias on a district-bydistrict basis by calculating the district’s “vote dilution index”: the
percentage of voters who could be drawn into competitive districts but who
have instead been “cracked” or “packed” into a noncompetitive district by
mapmakers. The application of that metric reveals not only that the
prevalence of partisan gerrymandering is more significant and, in many
districts, more extreme than previously known, but the precise degree to
which each district has been skewed to promote the dominance of one of the
major political parties at the expense of the power of individual voters. By
permitting comparison of the degree of vote dilution between districts while
simultaneously accounting for the limitations imposed by geographical
clustering of voters, the “vote dilution index” opens the door to partisan
gerrymandering claims that the Supreme Court left ajar in Whitford.

The date was October 26, 2017, and the Supreme Court was set to hear
oral arguments in Gill v. Whitford,1 a case heralded as the best chance to have
partisan gerrymandering declared unconstitutional in a generation, if not in
the history of the Court.2 The plaintiffs had persuaded a three-judge district
court in Wisconsin to throw out the state’s legislative map for failing a newly
minted constitutional test, known as the “efficiency gap” test, which

12/07/2018 13:09:16

1. 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
2. See, e.g., Michael Cooper, Gerrymandering Case Echoes in Inkblot-Like Districts Across
the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/us/gerrymanderingwisconsin-pennsylvania-maryland-supremecourt.html; Adam Liptak, When Does Partisan
Gerrymandering Cross a Constitutional Line?, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/05/15/us/politics/when-does-political-gerrymandering-cross-a-constitutional-line.html.
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measures partisan bias3 by comparing the number of “wasted votes” each
party receives in a given election on a statewide basis.4 Since Wisconsin’s
map consistently and systematically made it far easier for Republicans to
convert their supporters’ votes into legislative seats, the district court had
found the map violated the Equal Protection Clause. The questioning from
the bench left Supreme-Court-vote-counters predicting that partisan
gerrymandering would soon meet its demise under the force of Justice
Anthony Kennedy’s quill.5
And yet, almost as soon as the starting gun had gone off, the plaintiffs
were called for a false start. In a surprisingly unanimous opinion written by
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked
standing because they had failed to establish any individualized injury that
they had suffered in their own voting districts.6 The asserted injury of vote
dilution, the Court held, “arises from the particular composition of the
voter’s own district, which causes his vote . . . to carry less weight than it
would carry in another, hypothetical district.”7 Thus, plaintiffs who claim
an injury to their preferred party’s interests on a statewide basis fail to allege
the sort of particularized harm that is required to have standing to bring a suit
in federal court.8 As the Court put it, “[a] plaintiff who complains of
gerrymandering, but who does not live in a gerrymandered district, ‘assert[s]
only a generalized grievance against governmental conduct of which he or
she does not approve.’”9

40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 54 Side A
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3. Throughout this Article, we, joining the trend in the wider literature on the subject of
gerrymandering, use the term “bias” to refer to statewide asymmetry between the percentage of
votes won by a political party and the share of seats it earns in the resulting legislature. See Bernard
Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan
Gerrymandering after LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 10 (2006) (defining partisan bias as
“the degree to which an electoral system deviates from partisan symmetry”); Gary King & Robert
X. Browning, Democratic Representation and Partisan Bias in Congressional Elections, 81 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1251 (1987). We should not, therefore, be misunderstood, through our use of the
term, to be referring necessarily to intentional efforts to achieve partisan asymmetry, nor do we
make any normative claims about the desirability of such asymmetry for purposes of our discussion.
4. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the
Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 832 (2015). For the simplest and most intuitive explanation of
the efficiency gap metric we have found, see Darla Cameron, Here’s How the Supreme Court Could
Decide Whether Your Vote Will Count, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/graphics/2017/politics/courts-law/gerrymander/.
5. See, e.g., Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Cautious Optimism for Challengers in
Wisconsin Redistricting Case?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 3, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/1
0/argument-analysis-cautious-optimism-challengers-wisconsin-redistricting-case/.
6. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1930.
7. Id. at 1931.
8. Id.
9. Id. (quoting United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745 (1995)).
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What was needed, the Court said, was for the plaintiffs to point to an
injury arising from their placement into a district where they had less voting
power than they might otherwise have.10 After all, the Court stated, it is not
any statewide bias in a map, but “[t]he boundaries of the district” and “the
composition of its voters,” that “determine whether and to what extent a
particular voter has been,” in the parlance of the Supreme Court’s
redistricting jurisprudence, “packed” or “cracked” into noncompetitive
districts.11
Taking our cue from Chief Justice Roberts, we set out in this Article to
address the very question that the Court found the plaintiffs had left
unanswered in Whitford: “whether and to what extent a particular voter” has
been “packed or cracked” as a result of her placement on a legislative map.12
We set forth the very sort of district-specific metric of vote dilution that the
Court demanded (and found wanting) in Whitford, one which permits
assessment of “the particular composition of the voter’s own district” to
determine whether the mapmaker’s decisions have caused her vote “to carry
less weight than it would carry in another, hypothetical district.”13 In so
doing, we propose a method that permits a voter not merely to claim that she
could have been placed in a district where her voting power would be
increased, but to compare the degree of bias in her district to the other

40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 54 Side B
12/07/2018 13:09:16

10. See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1930–31. In this Article, we address only the standing
necessary to make a claim of constitutionally cognizable injury from vote dilution. Justice Kagan’s
concurrence in Whitford left open the possibility that a claim of statewide injury might formulate a
proper basis for a claim rooted in theory of “associational injury” under the First Amendment. See
id. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring); infra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. The majority
opinion, which Kagan joined in full, characterized any such theory as “speculative” and reminded
readers that “[t]he reasoning of this Court with respect to the disposition of this case is set forth in
this opinion and none other.” Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1931 (emphasis added). Whatever promise
such a theory may have, we do not endeavor to analyze or critique it here.
11. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1929. “Packing” refers to the practice of placing a number of
voters of one group into a particular district in order to diminish their ability to influence the
outcome of an election in another district. Id. at 1923. “Cracking” refers to the practice of
distributing a single group of voters across multiple districts in order to diminish their ability to
influence the outcome in any one district. Id.; see also Samuel S.H. Wang, Three Practical Tests
for Gerrymandering: Application to Maryland and Wisconsin, 15 ELECTION L.J. 367, 371 (2016)
(“State-level gerrymandering is more elaborate than single-district gerrymandering and relies on
an elaborate strategy. First, map drawers cram voters likely to favor their opponents so that they
are ‘packed’ into a few throwaway districts where the other side will win lopsided victories.
Second, state-level gerrymanders have a distinctive feature: the remaining, more numerous districts
are drawn with boundaries to yield more-narrowly won victories. For example, voters can be
‘cracked’ so that a bloc of votes is split across districts to dilute their impact and prevent them from
contributing to a majority in any one district. In this process, the critical requirement is asymmetry:
the opposing party’s voters must be more tightly packed than one’s own voters. The net result is
an increased likelihood of unrepresentative outcomes.”).
12. Id. at 1929.
13. Id. at 1931.
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districts in her state and across the country.14 We achieve this by comparing
each state’s current legislative map to a hypothetical map with the greatest
possible number of competitive districts and calculating, for each existing
district, the percentage of voters who could be placed in such a competitive
district but have instead been placed in a “safe” (i.e., noncompetitive)
district.15 The resulting “vote dilution index” (or “VDI”), which captures
both “packing” and “cracking” of voters, supplies the missing link the Court
required in Whitford for plaintiffs to demonstrate a constitutionally
redressable injury.16
Our discussion is divided into three principal parts. We begin by
summarizing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the context of both
partisan and racial gerrymandering from its genesis until Whitford.17 Next,
we offer an assessment of the “efficiency gap” and competing partisan
asymmetry metrics as measures of partisan vote dilution and identify which
of their shortcomings must be corrected in order to surmount the hurdle of
Whitford.18 We then introduce, illustrate, and ultimately apply the vote
dilution index in order to ascertain the degree of gerrymandering in each of
the country’s 435 federal Congressional districts, pointing up the promise of
the “vote dilution index” as a superior measure of vote dilution after
Whitford.19

I. The Emerging Jurisprudence of Partisan Gerrymandering

See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.

12/07/2018 13:09:16

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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In order to justify the validity of the “vote dilution index” as a proper
district-specific measure of partisan gerrymandering, we first undertake a
brief review of the jurisprudential constraints imposed on any such metric by
the Supreme Court’s redistricting case law. First, we summarize the Court’s
racial gerrymandering jurisprudence and assess how the elements of
successful racial gerrymandering claims inform the analysis of partisan
gerrymandering claims.20 We then review the Court’s few partisan
gerrymandering cases, focusing on the limitations the Court has placed on
these claims and identifying the common pitfalls of pursuing a claim of
gerrymandering based upon partisan bias.21 Finally, we examine the Court’s
holding in Whitford itself, paying special attention to the requirements the
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Court imposed for establishing standing for a plaintiff who asserts an injury
from partisan gerrymandering.22
A. Lessons from the Racial Gerrymandering Cases
So far, the only context in which the Supreme Court has recognized a
constitutionally redressable injury from gerrymandering is in the area of
racially conscious map-drawing.23 As the court’s racial gerrymandering
cases demonstrate, race-based vote dilution can occur in one of two ways:
first, by “packing,” whereby voters of a single racial group are crowded into
a single district in order to reduce their ability to influence elections outside
of the district,24 and second, by “cracking,” whereby voters of a single racial
group are split among several districts in order to reduce their ability to
influence the outcome of any single election.25 In either case, where racial
gerrymandering is done intentionally, the Court has found that it may violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.26 The Court has further held
that a plaintiff advancing a racial gerrymandering claim must establish
“individualized harm,” either by showing that she resides in a racially
gerrymandered district or by providing specific evidence tending to show
that she was personally subjected to a racial classification.27
Under the standard that has emerged in racial gerrymandering cases, a
plaintiff can succeed if she demonstrates that “race was the predominant
factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of
voters within or without” the district in which she resides.28 If the plaintiff
makes that showing, the burden shifts to the state to establish that it meets
strict scrutiny, i.e., that it has a compelling interest in considering race and

40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 55 Side B
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22. See infra Part I.C.
23. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017); Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama,
135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952
(1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
24. See, e.g., Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 471.
25. See, e.g., Wright, 376 U.S. at 53–54; Wang, supra note 11.
26. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1463. While intent has been an obvious indicator of
unconstitutionality in racial gerrymandering cases, its application in partisan gerrymandering cases
is more problematic, as the Court has suggested that some partisan consideration in redistricting is
acceptable. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973); see also infra Part I.B.
27. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744–45 (1995). Justice O’Connor’s majority
opinion in Hays states that the racial composition of a district, without more, is insufficient to
establish a racial gerrymandering claim. Id. at 746; see also Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 28, 30
(2000) (noting that existence of an adjacent majority-minority district did not provide standing
sufficient to advance a claim of racial gerrymandering).
28. Miller, 515 U.S. at 919; see also Ala. Legis. Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1265 (requiring
district-specific challenges in racial gerrymandering cases).
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that the approach taken is narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling
interest.29
One interest that the Court has “long assumed” is compelling is the
state’s need to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965
(“VRA”).30 Section 2 of the VRA prohibits any practice that “results in the
denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race.”31 As
interpreted by the Supreme Court, that provision prevents a legislature from
pursuing a policy of vote dilution based upon race.32 If a redistricting plan
can be shown to have done that, it potentially violates the VRA. To shift the
burden of justifying the use of race in drawing maps under VRA to the state,
a plaintiff must show that she is a member of a “politically cohesive”
minority group that is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in some reasonably configured legislative district”33
and that the white majority of the district “votes sufficiently as a bloc” to
defeat a minority candidate in the ordinary case.34
The Supreme Court’s racial gerrymandering cases provide several
important lessons for those who would seek to establish standing to
challenge partisan gerrymandering as unconstitutional.35 First, the cases
illustrate that a plaintiff whose voting power has been diminished as a result
of the manner in which her district’s lines have been drawn suffers a
cognizable injury-in-fact.36 Second, they teach us that, even if such a
plaintiff may have been injured, a gerrymandering claim cannot succeed if a
particular group has no realistic hope of electing the representative of its
choice—i.e., if it is either not cohesive or not numerous enough to constitute
a majority in an alternative district.37 And third, as the Court reminded us in
Whitford, an injury claimed under the Equal Protection Clause of the
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 56 Side A
12/07/2018 13:09:16

29. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1464.
30. Id. at 1461.
31. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (1982).
32. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 n.11 (1986).
33. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1470 (quoting Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50–51) (internal quotations
omitted).
34. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50.
35. Indeed, the Whitford Court expressly pointed to several principles developed in its racial
gerrymandering jurisprudence in its effort to explain the requirements of Article III standing. See
infra notes 46–47, 57, 81 and accompanying text.
36. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744–45 (1995); see also Ala. Legis. Black Caucus
v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (requiring district-specific challenges in racial gerrymandering
cases). Whether an injury-in-fact had been established was not expressly considered in any of the
partisan gerrymandering cases prior to Whitford, as those cases were disposed of on other grounds.
See infra Part I.B.
37. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1470. Although the Court has treated this as a merits question, it
might plausibly be viewed as a question of redressability. See infra note 128 and accompanying
text.
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Constitution must rest on the premise that dilution has occurred with respect
to the plaintiff’s power to affect electoral outcomes in her own district, not a
political group’s ability to compete on a statewide basis.38
B. Pre-Whitford Partisan Gerrymandering Law

12/07/2018 13:09:16

38. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1470.
39. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1926.
40. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). A key holding in Gaffney was that the
principle of “one man one vote,” which applied to federal congressional redistricting, did not extend
to state legislative redistricting. Id. at 741–42. Thus, whereas the federal rule required strict
adherence to grossly proportional representation, state legislative redistricting could diverge from
strict proportionality, so long as the divergence was “based on legitimate considerations incident
to the effectuation of a rational state policy.” Id. at 742 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
579 (1964)).
41. Id. at 752.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 754.

40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 56 Side B

Whereas racial gerrymandering cases have provided fertile ground for
those seeking redress under the Equal Protection Clause, partisan
gerrymandering cases have largely been fruitless. As Chief Justice Roberts
expressed at the outset of his opinion in Whitford, the Supreme Court’s
previous attempts to determine what constitutes partisan gerrymandering
have “left few clear landmarks for addressing the question.”39 The initial
guidepost remains the first case in which the Supreme Court took up the issue
of partisan gerrymandering, Gaffney v. Cummings.40 Ironically, the issue in
Gaffney was the precise opposite of the one raised by the plaintiffs in
Whitford: the statewide legislative map had been consciously drawn to favor
neither the Democratic nor Republican party, but instead to provide a rough
measure of electoral balance between the two.41 Justice White, writing for
the majority, believed the mere presence of political motivations to be
constitutionally unproblematic: “[i]t would be idle,” he said, “to contend that
any political consideration taken into account in fashioning a
reapportionment plan is sufficient to invalidate it.”42
While the Gaffney Court acknowledged that political gerrymandering
could run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment if “political groups have been
fenced out of the political process and their voting strength invidiously
minimized,” it concluded that removal of politics from the redistricting
process was an “impossible task,” with the implication that it was not one
for courts to undertake.43 In other words, although the Gaffney Court
suggested that partisan gerrymandering could reach such a level that it would
be unconstitutional, it offered little guidance on how to assess or identify
any such violation.
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The Court’s next foray into partisan gerrymandering came thirteen
years later in Davis v. Bandemer, the first (and so far the only) case in which
the Court has recognized the justiciability of a claim based upon partisan
gerrymandering.44 The case arose from a claim by Indiana Democrats that
the state Republican party had purposefully redistricted the statewide map to
disadvantage the Democratic party.45 The Court reversed the three-judge
panel that had agreed with the Democrats and found an Equal Protection
Clause violation, but it was sharply divided in its analysis of the claims.
The threshold issue in the case was justiciability. A majority of Justices
agreed the case was justiciable, relying on the rationale from racial
gerrymandering cases46 that, when an identifiable group “had an insufficient
chance to elect a representative of its choice,” it could seek redress in court.47
Three Justices, concurring in the judgment, strongly disagreed, arguing that
partisan gerrymandering claims by political parties should be precluded
under the political question doctrine.48 The Court fractured further on
whether an Equal Protection Clause violation existed. A plurality found it
did not because insufficient proof was offered to show that the partisan
gerrymander had “consistently degrade[d] a voter’s or a group of voters’
influence on the political process as a whole.”49 The two remaining Justices
who found the case justiciable proposed a complex balancing test, while the
three Justices concurring in the judgment would not have even reached the
issue.50 Bandemer thus provides tentative support for two propositions: (1)
that partisan gerrymandering cases are indeed justiciable; and (2) that
proving an Equal Protection Clause violation requires evidence that the
“electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their
opportunity to influence the political process effectively.”51
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 57 Side A
12/07/2018 13:09:16

44. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
45. As in Gaffney, the challenge was to the statewide map in its entirety. Cf. Gaffney, 412
U.S. at 754. The Indiana Democratic Party presented evidence that in the statewide races for the
Indiana House of Representatives, the Democrats had received 51.9 percent of the vote, but only
won 43 of 100 available seats. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 115. The lower court’s ruling
invalidating the statewide map was based upon multiple issues with the map itself, as opposed to a
claim of vote dilution in any particular district. Id. at 116–17.
46. See supra Part I.A.
47. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 124.
48. Id. at 162 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor was joined by Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger and Justice William Rehnquist.
49. Id. at 132.
50. Id. at 144, 173.
51. Id. at 133. How to determine whether “certain voters” are disadvantaged was left open
by the Court. The type of statistical analysis employed in Whitford and proposed herein was not
considered by the Bandemer Court. See id. at 116 n.3 (“A multitude of conflicting statistical
evidence was also introduced at the trial. The District Court, however, specifically declined to
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Those principles were called into question in Vieth v. Jubelirer,52 a case
in which Pennsylvania Democrats challenged a map allegedly favoring
Republicans at the expense of “traditional redistricting criteria.”53 A
plurality of the Court voted to overrule Bandemer as wrongly decided, as
“no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating
political gerrymandering claims ha[d] emerged” in the eighteen years since
Bandemer was handed down.54 However, Justice Kennedy’s opinion
concurring in the judgment preserved Bandemer, even though he agreed with
the plurality that no workable standard had yet been advanced to adjudicate
partisan gerrymandering claims.55 Justice Kennedy refused to foreclose the
possibility that a workable standard could be developed:
[N]ew technologies may produce new methods of analysis that
make more evident the precise nature of the burdens
gerrymanders impose on the representational rights of voters
and parties. That would facilitate court efforts to identify and
remedy the burdens, with judicial intervention limited by the
derived standards.56
The dissenters in Vieth, on the other hand, all would have upheld
Bandemer, though each proposed different standards for judicial
management of partisan gerrymandering claims. One standard would permit
a claim that a particular district had been drawn in such a way as to unduly
burden the claimant’s participation in elections,57 whereas another would
have permitted a claim when the plaintiff could show “unjustified use of
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credit any of this evidence, noting that it did not ‘wish to choose which statistician is more credible
or less credible.’” (internal citation omitted)).
52. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
53. Id. at 272.
54. Id. at 281. The plurality also engaged in a historical analysis, first finding that the Framers
had vested in Congress, not the courts, the power to override state legislative maps, see U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 4, and then determining that Bandemer must be incorrect because the lower courts had been
incapable of fashioning a workable standard for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims. See
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 274–81. The professed absence of a judicially manageable standard, however,
seems to be the primary justification for the plurality’s holding that Bandemer should be
overturned.
55. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 312, 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy agreed with
Bandemer’s conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment provided the basis for a claim of partisan
gerrymandering, but further noted that a “subsidiary standard” would likely be necessary to
establish any such claim. Id. at 314. Justice Kennedy posited that such a standard would need to
show “how an otherwise permissible classification, as applied, burdens representational
rights . . . .” Id.
56. Id. at 312–13 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 330–31 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens drew primarily from the Court’s
racial gerrymandering jurisprudence, see supra Part I.A, in crafting this standard.
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58. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 360–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) [hereinafter LULAC].
60. Id. at 413–14. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined the Court’s disposition on
the issue of justiciability because it had not been argued in the instant case, potentially leaving the
door open to a justiciability challenge in the future. Whitford did not reach the issue. See Gill v.
Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1931 (2018).
61. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 419–20.
62. See Brief for Gary King, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, at 5, LULAC,
548 U.S. 399 (2006), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legalwork/Brief_Amici_C
uriae_Professors_King_Grofman_Gelman_Katz.pdf.
63. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 420. The Court specifically noted that it was “wary of adopting a
constitutional standard that invalidates a map based on unfair results that would occur in a
hypothetical state of affairs.” Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 423.
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political factors to entrench a minority in power.”58 Unlike Gaffney and
Bandemer, the proposed standards required showing harm by an individual
claimant on a district-specific level, rather than a more generalized harm
arising from a statewide map, in order to establish a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
The Court’s final partisan gerrymandering decision prior to Whitford
was League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry.59 After
setting aside the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering cases,60 the Court
turned once again to whether a judicially manageable standard had been
established. The Court specifically took up an argument from an amicus
brief, which had proposed a “symmetry standard” that measured the bias
inherent in a map based upon “the extent to which a majority party would
fare better than the minority party, should their respective shares of the vote
reverse.”61 In other words, if the Democratic Party were to receive 55
percent of the vote and 70 percent of the legislative seats, this result would
reflect partisan bias only if the Republican party would obtain more or less
than 70 percent of the seats when receiving 55 percent of the vote.62 The
Court rejected this standard, finding it too speculative and reliant on
counterfactuals, and holding that any workable standard must be rooted in
actual harm to particular voters or voting groups.63 The Court stressed that
the partisan symmetry standard failed to answer the fundamental question of
“how much partisan dominance is too much.”64 As a result, it found the
plaintiffs had established “no legally impermissible use of political
classifications” in the redistricting at issue.65
The pre-Whitford jurisprudence, muddled as it is, sheds light on how
the Court is likely to evaluate partisan gerrymandering claims going forward.
First, although the Court has held these claims justiciable, the Court will be
unlikely to grant relief until it is able to articulate a judicially manageable
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standard for assessing claims of partisan gerrymandering. Second, any such
proposed standard would need to establish a significant burden on
representational rights, and do so in a manner that courts could readily
administer. Finally, since a showing of actual harm is required, a standard
that employs speculative counterfactual analyses is likely too attenuated
from actual harm to provide a workable standard.
C. Whitford and the Supreme Court Debut of the Efficiency Gap

12/07/2018 13:09:16

66. See generally Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4. For the simplest and most
intuitive explanation of the efficiency gap metric we have been able to find, see Cameron, supra
note 4.
67. See infra Part II.B (detailing the calculation and operation of the efficiency gap metric).
68. See, e.g., Radiolab, Who’s Gerry and Why Is He So Bad at Drawing Maps?, NPR (Oct.
2, 2017), https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/whos-gerry-and-why-he-so-bad-drawing-maps.
69. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 312–13 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
70. Liptak, supra note 2.
71. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 834.
72. Id.
73. See Sam Kean, The Flaw in America’s “Holy Grail” Against Gerrymandering, THE
ATLANTIC (Jan 26. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/01/efficiency-gapgerrymandering/551492/ (“It’s intuitive and easy to calculate, requiring little more than
arithmetic. . . . Perhaps best of all, it boils gerrymandering—an unholy mix of geometry and
demographics—down to a ‘single tidy number’ . . . .”).
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Nearly as soon as it was published,66 the efficiency gap metric67
proposed by Professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos and his colleague Eric
McGhee was the subject of great academic and popular interest.68 The
authors claimed to have solved the puzzle posed by Justice Kennedy in his
concurrence in Vieth: the enigma of developing a judicially manageable
standard for measuring partisan gerrymandering.69 The efficiency gap was
heralded as the answer to Justice Kennedy’s call, and to the prayers of the
opponents of partisan gerrymandering. The New York Times’ Adam Liptak
declared that Stephanopoulos and McGhee “may have found [the] holy
grail” in the quest to stop partisan gerrymandering.70 Or so the story went.
The logic of the efficiency gap was intuitive. Since political parties
achieve asymmetric dominance by “packing” some of their opponents’
voters into safe districts and “cracking” others across multiple districts, the
efficiency gap was designed to calculate the degree to which such “packing”
and “cracking” had enabled either party to more “efficiently” convert its
votes into legislative seats.71 It did this by comparing the number of votes
each party “wasted” across a statewide election, either by casting votes for a
losing candidate, or by casting more votes than were needed for a winning
candidate.72 By “boiling down” partisan gerrymandering claims into a
“single tidy number,”73 the efficiency gap permitted its creators to propose a
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presumptive threshold beyond which partisan gerrymandering could be
assumed to be unconstitutional.74
Adding the efficiency gap to their quiver, plaintiffs in Wisconsin
brought a case challenging the state legislative map as being an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, with the efficiency gap squarely at
the center of the case as the plaintiffs’ best evidence. The trial, we are told,
was something of a referendum on the efficiency gap, with dueling experts
sparring over its reliability and workability.75 Ultimately, the three-judge
district court was persuaded to find Wisconsin’s statewide map to be an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, and the case went to the Supreme
Court on direct appeal.76
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of a unanimous court,
finding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish standing to challenge
Wisconsin’s map.77 The Chief Justice noted that, while the case had focused
on whether metrics like the efficiency gap provided manageable standards to
permit judicial review, the plaintiffs had overlooked the need to first
establish a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy before the
court.78 Reminding the plaintiffs that “[a] federal court is not a forum for
generalized grievances,”79 the Chief Justice wrote that “a plaintiff who
complains of gerrymandering, but who does not live in a gerrymandered
district, asserts only a generalized grievance against governmental conduct
of which he or she does not approve.”80 The Chief Justice said that the right
to vote, being “individual and personal in nature,” requires a voter to allege
a “disadvantage to the voter as an individual” resulting “from the boundaries
of the particular district in which he resides.”81
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74. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 896.
75. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 859–62 (W.D. Wisc. 2016) (summarizing
testimony of four experts who presented evidence of possible partisan bias in Wisconsin’s state
legislative map); see Wang, supra note 11, at 382 (“In Whitford, the districting plan was evaluated
using a recently developed measure of asymmetry, the efficiency gap. Expert witness Prof. Simon
Jackman established the statistical properties of the efficiency gap in a presentation that included
36 figures. This report was challenged by the state’s expert witness, who focused on the question
of how much asymmetry came from population clustering; that expert was, in turn, counterchallenged.”).
76. Cases involving redistricting are among the limited set of cases for which the Supreme
Court has direct, mandatory appellate jurisdiction by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2018).
77. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930 (2018).
78. Id. at 1932 (noting that, while some plaintiffs had alleged personal injuries-in-fact, “[a]s
the proceedings in the District Court progressed to trial, the plaintiffs failed to meaningfully pursue
their allegations of individual harm”).
79. Id. at 1929 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
80. Id. at 1930.
81. Id. at 1929–30 (internal quotations, emendations, and citations omitted). This holding
echoes the rationale employed by the Court in its analysis of standing in racial gerrymandering
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Thus, the Court held, any claim of partisan vote dilution must be alleged
on a per-district basis.82 The Chief Justice drew an analogy to the Court’s
racial gerrymandering cases, in which a plaintiff has standing “to assert only
that his own district has been . . . gerrymandered,”83 and in which complaints
therefore “must proceed district-by-district” rather than on a statewide
basis.84 Likewise, the Chief Justice said partisan gerrymandering claims
must be based on an assertion that “the particular composition of the voter’s
own district [has caused] his vote—having been packed or cracked—to carry
less weight than it would carry in another, hypothetical district.”85 Because
the Court found the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate an injury of this sort,
it left “for another day consideration of other possible theories of harm . . .
and whether those theories might present justiciable claims giving rise to
statewide remedies.”86
The Chief Justice also took the time to point to the deficiencies of the
efficiency gap as a method of detecting the sort of district-specific injury
required by the Court’s standing jurisprudence. Putting aside technical
objections to the metric’s utility,87 the Chief Justice succinctly summarized
the limitations of the efficiency gap and other measures of partisan
asymmetry as evidence of individualized harm:
The difficulty for standing purposes is that these calculations
are an average measure. They do not address the effect that a
gerrymander has on the votes of particular citizens. Partisanasymmetry metrics such as the efficiency gap measure
something else entirely: the effect that a gerrymander has on
the fortunes of political parties.

12/07/2018 13:09:16

cases. See supra Part I.A; United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744–45 (1995); Sinkfield v. Kelley,
531 U.S. 28, 30 (2000).
82. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1930 (“To the extent the plaintiffs’ alleged harm is the dilution of
their votes, that injury is district specific. An individual voter in Wisconsin is placed in a single
district. He votes for a single representative. The boundaries of the district, and the composition
of its voters, determine whether and to what extent a particular voter is packed or cracked.”).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1931; cf. id. at 1935 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“The harm of vote dilution . . . arises
when an election practice—most commonly, the drawing of district lines—devalues one citizen’s
vote as compared to others.”).
86. Id. at 1931.
87. See infra Part II.B.
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Consider the situation of Professor Whitford, who lives in
District 76, where, defendants contend, Democrats are
“naturally” packed due to their geographic concentration, with
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that of plaintiff Mary Lynne Donohue, who lives in Assembly
District 26 in Sheboygan, where Democrats like her have
allegedly been deliberately cracked. By all accounts, Act 43
has not affected Whitford’s individual vote for his Assembly
representative—even plaintiffs’ own demonstration map
resulted in a virtually identical district for him. Donohue, on
the other hand, alleges that Act 43 burdened her individual
vote. Yet neither the efficiency gap nor the other measures of
partisan asymmetry offered by the plaintiffs are capable of
telling the difference between what Act 43 did to Whitford and
what it did to Donohue. The single statewide measure of
partisan advantage delivered by the efficiency gap treats
Whitford and Donohue as indistinguishable, even though their
individual situations are quite different.88

12/07/2018 13:09:16

88. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1933. We dare say that the metric we propose solves precisely
the problem the Chief Justice identified in Whitford. See infra Part III.
89. Id. at 1934, 1941. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, concurred
in the entirety of the Court’s opinion, except its decision to remand the case rather than dismiss it.
90. Id. at 1934 (Kagan, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 1936.
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The Court declined to enter judgment for the defendants, electing, in
light of the unclarity of the record before it, to remand for further proceedings
in which the plaintiffs could seek to demonstrate district-specific harms to
their individual rights to vote.89
Justice Elena Kagan concurred in order to elaborate on what would be
required for plaintiffs to establish an injury under the Court’s standing
doctrine.90 As Justice Kagan explained, a plaintiff claiming vote dilution
must show that, because she lives in a “packed” or “cracked” district, her
vote “carries less weight—has less consequence—than it would under a
neutrally drawn map.”91 If, Justice Kagan posited, a plaintiff were able to
show that, on a map drawn according to nonpartisan criteria, she would
reside in a substantially more competitive district, such evidence would be
adequate for her to establish the sort of injury necessary for her to have
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standing.92 Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor concurred, leaving
them one vote shy of a majority.93
Although it portrays itself as a straightforward application of the
Supreme Court’s standing doctrine (and it is), Whitford reveals a deep chasm
of difference between the approaches taken heretofore by social scientists,
which, like the efficiency gap, aim to detect systemic partisan bias,94 and the
approach evidently preferred by a unanimous Supreme Court. Whitford
reminds us that the injury the Court might plausibly remedy in a
gerrymandering case is not a mere imbalance in statewide partisan
efficiency, but rather the cause of that imbalance: the dilution of individual
votes.95 While that change in focus may not make evidence of statewide
partisan asymmetry totally irrelevant, after Whitford, it is not dispositive, nor
perhaps even necessary. As we explain below, substantial vote dilution often
occurs in systems with modest or no partisan asymmetry, as where the major
parties conspire to draw maps that minimize the number of contests in which
they will have to compete against each other to win, and the efficiency gap
is therefore markedly underinclusive as a measure of vote dilution.96 After
Whitford, these “balanced” but noncompetitive maps too are up for grabs.

II. Meeting the Demands of Whitford
Whitford reminds us that, regardless of the potential merit of the
efficiency gap as a method of measuring the overall partisan bias in a
statewide map, it is definitionally incapable of identifying a district-specific
injury.97 It is therefore necessary to develop some method of articulating a
district-specific injury from partisan gerrymandering that is at least sufficient
to show an “injury-in-fact” that would allow plaintiffs to get in the
courthouse door.98 Once such an injury is identified, the efficiency gap and
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 60 Side B
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92. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1936 (“For example, a Democratic plaintiff living in a 75%Democratic district could prove she was packed by presenting a different map, drawn without a
focus on partisan advantage, that would place her in a 60%-Democratic district. Or conversely, a
Democratic plaintiff residing in a 35%-Democratic district could prove she was cracked by offering
an alternative, neutrally drawn map putting her in a 50-50 district. The precise numbers are of no
import. The point is that the plaintiff can show, through drawing alternative district lines, that
partisan-based packing or cracking diluted her vote.”).
93. Id. at 1934.
94. See Grofman & King, supra note 3, at 6 (“Social scientists have long recognized partisan
symmetry as the appropriate way to define partisan fairness in the American system of pluralitybased elections, and for many years such a view has been virtually a consensus position of the
scholarly community.”).
95. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1930.
96. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
97. See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1930.
98. Id.
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other metrics may be utilized to meet the burden of showing a constitutional
violation on the merits, but establishing a plaintiff’s standing is an
ineluctable first step.99
This Part begins by summarizing the demands that Whitford and the
Court’s standing doctrine in general will place upon plaintiffs who seek to
have a map declared to have been unconstitutionally gerrymandered.100 We
then turn our microscope on the efficiency gap and competing measures of
partisan asymmetry, exploring their strengths and their deficits, both as a
means of establishing partisan asymmetry and as a tool for demonstrating a
personalized injury arising from an allegedly unconstitutional map.101
A. Criteria for an Acceptable Measure of Standing After Whitford
Any metric that would seek to establish standing for a plaintiff must,
after Whitford, measure a district-specific injury.102 In other words, it must
show that a plaintiff has personally suffered vote dilution as a result of the
manner in which the legislature has chosen to the draw the legislative map.103
A metric that, like the efficiency gap, merely identifies a statewide imbalance
in voting power between the political parties will therefore fail to surpass
that bar.104
Whitford’s rule rests upon well-settled principles of the Court’s
standing jurisprudence.105 Those principles tell us that, in order for a case to
present a “case or controversy” under Article III of the Constitution, a
plaintiff must show an “injury-in-fact” that is traceable to the conduct of the
defendants and which could be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.106
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99. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 856 (comparing the efficiency gap to
partisan bias, a competing measure of partisan asymmetry).
100. See infra Part II.A.
101. See infra Part II.B.
102. See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1930.
103. See id. at 1930 (requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate a “disadvantage to the voter as an
individual” resulting from “the boundaries of the particular district in which he resides”).
104. See id. at 1930–31. The efficiency gap is not alone in its emphasis on statewide partisan
asymmetry, an analytical focus that is nearly uniform in academic literature on the subject of
partisan gerrymandering. See Grofman & King, supra note 3, at 6 (“Social scientists have long
recognized partisan symmetry as the appropriate way to define partisan fairness in the American
system of plurality-based elections, and for many years such a view has been virtually a consensus
position of the scholarly community.”). For the same reason, many other proposed methods that
seek to measure gerrymandering as a function of statewide partisan asymmetry will likely be
deemed constitutionally insufficient measures of vote dilution after Whitford.
105. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
106. Id. at 560–61 (“[O]ur cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum
of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the
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To establish an injury, a plaintiff must point to an alleged harm that is
personal to him and which is therefore, in the language of the Court, more
than a mere “generalized grievance.”107 The injury must also be “concrete
and particularized,” a qualification designed to exclude claims that are based
upon abstract harms that are not readily susceptible to judicial redress.108
An adequate measure of district-specific vote dilution, therefore, cannot
be based simply on the fact that a voter finds herself in a political minority
in any particular legislative district. If, because the constraints imposed by
geography and population distribution patterns, the voter cannot be drawn
into a district where she would have a realistic chance of electing the
representative of her choice, then her “injury” can neither be said to be
traceable to the conduct of the mapmaker nor redressable by a court.109 If
she is harmed at all, her harm arises because of the location in which she
resides and not because of any action taken by any putative defendant.110
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injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action
of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the
court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision.” (internal quotations and emendations omitted)).
107. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179–80 (1974) (restating the “basic
principle” that “to invoke judicial power the claimant must have a ‘personal stake in the outcome,’
or a ‘particular, concrete injury,’ or ‘a direct injury’; in short, something more than ‘generalized
grievances’” (internal citations omitted)).
108. See Warth v. Seiden, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975) (“Absent the necessary allegations of
demonstrable, particularized injury, there can be no confidence of a real need to exercise the power
of judicial review or that relief can be framed no broader than required by the precise facts to which
the court’s ruling would be applied.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
109. See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1932 (noting that the lead plaintiff, even under the plaintiffs’
proposed alternative map, would still reside in a district with an overwhelming Democratic
majority); see also Bruce E. Cain et al., A Reasonable Bias Approach to Gerrymandering: Using
Automated Plan Generation to Evaluate Redistricting Proposals, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1521,
1531–32 (2018) (“While the Court could take the view that a constitutional partisan
gerrymandering doctrine ought to correct for imbalances in the way partisans are distributed across
space, it is more likely that the Court will find that natural gerrymanders are a permissible price of
redistricting regime . . . . [A] high-functioning measure of partisan effect must be able not only to
parse out natural gerrymanders from unnatural ones, but also to quantify the effects of each.”); cf.
infra Part III (proposing a metric that would quantify the effects of partisan gerrymanders while
accounting for geographic limitations).
110. See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1933 (“Consider the situation of Professor Whitford, who lives
in District 76, where, defendants contend, Democrats are ‘naturally’ packed due to their geographic
concentration . . . . By all accounts, Act 43 has not affected Whitford’s individual vote for his
Assembly representative—even plaintiffs’ own demonstration map resulted in a virtually identical
district for him.”). The inability to account for the challenges presented by an uneven geographic
distribution of partisan preference is an endemic problem among most existing measures of partisan
asymmetry. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 11, at 381–82 (noting that two of the author’s proposed
tests “are oriented towards the outcomes of elections rather than the specifics of map boundaries”
and “do not rely on geographically oriented approaches which require normative assumptions of
what constitutes good districting procedure”).
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A proper measure of district-specific vote dilution must instead permit
a plaintiff to claim that, if not for the partisan effect resulting from her
district’s specific lines, her voting power would be increased, i.e., that under
a more competitive map, she would have a substantially greater chance of
her vote impacting electoral outcomes.111 Ideally, such a metric would also
permit comparison not only between the status quo and other possible maps,
but between districts, thereby allowing a determination of how large an
impact the partisan bias of a particular map has had on the voting power of
individuals within any particular district relative to other districts, and
relative to the whole.112
B. The Promise—and Shortcomings—of the Efficiency Gap
The efficiency gap is defined by its originators as representing “the
difference between the parties’ respective wasted votes in an election—
where a vote is wasted if it is cast (1) for a losing candidate, or (2) for a
winning candidate but in excess of what she needed to prevail.”113 The
“wasted” votes for each party are added together on a statewide basis, and
the difference between the two is then divided by the total number of votes
cast, resulting in a percentage representing the efficiency gap.114 Although
the efficiency gap is calculated on a per-election basis, it may be tracked over
time to determine the degree to which any partisan bias is a structural, as
opposed to merely incidental, consequence of a particular map.115
The efficiency gap presents two major advantages that make it a leading
candidate as a measure of partisan bias. First, as its originators point out, it
“avoids the need to estimate hypothetical election results”; rather, “[t]he
parties’ respective wasted votes are calculated using actual election
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 62 Side A
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111. See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1931 (noting that claims of vote dilution rest on the claim that
“the particular composition of the voter’s own district . . . causes his vote—having been packed or
cracked—to carry less weight than it would carry in another, hypothetical district”); id. at 1932
(illustrating how, even under plaintiffs’ proposed map, Professor Whitford would still be located
in a “safe” Democratic district).
112. Cain, supra note 109, at 1531–32 (2018) (“[A] high-functioning measure of partisan
effect must be able not only to parse out natural gerrymanders from unnatural ones, but also to
quantify the effects of each.”); cf. infra Part III (proposing a metric that would quantify the effects
of partisan gerrymanders while accounting for geographic limitations).
113. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 834.
114. Id.
115. Id. The efficiency gap itself does not distinguish between packed and cracked districts,
but dissecting the “wasted votes” that serve as its inputs may offer some clues. See also Mira
Bernstein & Moon Duchin, A Formula Goes to Court: Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency
Gap, 64 NOTICES OF THE AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 1020, 1021 (2017) (“If (nearly) all the
wasted votes belong to the winning side, it’s a packed district. If (nearly) all the wasted votes
belong to the losing side, it’s a competitive district. And if there are several adjacent districts where
most of the wasted votes are on the losing side, then it may be a cracked plan.”).
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outcomes.”116 Thus, it does not require analysts to make counterfactual
assumptions about how elections would have turned out had the map been
drawn differently.117 Instead, it is analytically focused on measuring a single
number: the degree to which a party is able “to convert its votes into seats
more efficiently than its adversary—even if the edge would vanish under
different electoral conditions.”118 And, since it looks directly at the results
of past elections, it “can therefore provide evidence of real harm”119 (albeit
on a statewide, as opposed to a district-by-district, basis).
Another characteristic of the efficiency gap that recommends it as a
judicially manageable standard is that it requires only very basic
arithmetic.120 A fifth grader with a pencil and a calculator could easily
calculate the efficiency gap for even the most complex map.121 It therefore
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116. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 896.
117. Id. at 855.
118. Id. at 859.
119. Kean, supra note 73.
120. Id. (“It’s intuitive and easy to calculate, requiring little more than arithmetic . . . . Perhaps
best of all, it boils gerrymandering—an unholy mix of geometry and demographics—down to a
‘single tidy number’ . . . .”); Garrett Epps, The Supreme Court’s Choice on Partisan
Gerrymandering, THE ATLANTIC (Mar., 28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2
018/03/the-supreme-courts-choice-on-partisan-gerrymandering/556661/ (“[W]ith a modicum of
effort, even a J.D. could understand it.”); Sam Wang & Brian Remlinger, How to Spot an
Unconstitutionally Partisan Gerrymander, Explained, VOX (Jan. 17, 2018) (“Far from being
gobbledygook, as Chief Justice John Roberts memorably put it, the simplest statistical methods are
more than a century old, invented for real-world needs like beer quality control. And if brewers
can harness the power of statistical reasoning, surely judges and reformers can too . . . . Some of
the most promising statistical measures of gerrymandering can be understood by a high schooler or
even a grade school student.”); Nate Cohn & Quoctrung Bui, How the New Math of
Gerrymandering Works, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10
/03/upshot/how-the-new-math-of-gerrymandering-works-supreme-court.html (“Over all, it’s a
simple measure that elegantly follows the logic of partisan gerrymandering.”). But see Bernstein
& Duchin, supra note 115, at 1024 (“Legal scholars believe that [the efficiency gap] will appeal to
the courts because of its simple, one-shot construction with no technical machinery. As we have
seen, the simplicity is actually illusory: a lot of care, including further statistical testing and
modeling, is required to use [it] responsibly.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Gill v. Whitford,
138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161) (remarks of Roberts, C.J.) (“[I]f you’re the intelligent man
on the street and the Court issues a decision, and let’s say the Democrats win, and that person will
say: Well, why did the Democrats win? And the answer is going to be because EG was greater
than 7 percent, where EG is the sigma of party X wasted votes minus the sigma of party Y wasted
votes over the sigma of party X votes plus party Y votes. And the intelligent man on the street is
going to say that’s a bunch of baloney. It must be because the Supreme Court preferred the
Democrats over the Republicans. And that’s going to come out one case after another as these
cases are brought in every state.”).
121. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018) (reciting plaintiffs’ contention that
“the efficiency gap and similar measures of partisan asymmetry will allow the federal courts—
armed with just ‘a pencil and paper or a hand calculator’—to finally solve the problem of partisan
gerrymandering”); Brief for Bipartisan Group of 65 Current and Former State Legislators as Amici
Curiae at 6, 25, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161); Christopher Chambers et
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reduces the need for experts to explain complex algorithmic processes to
jurists who ordinarily are not, by training, experts in statistics, let alone mapdrawing, and promises to tamp down courtroom battles between experts over
which among the possible maps best complies with traditional redistricting
criteria.122 As its originators suggest, that means that the efficiency gap
“could be straightforwardly converted into doctrine.”123
As Whitford itself revealed, however, the efficiency gap has limitations
which make it an imperfect (or at least an incomplete) measure of partisan
bias.124 First, as Whitford notes, even a finding of an extreme efficiency gap
between the two parties does not, on its own, provide an account of how any
such gap causes a concrete and particularized injury to a voter within the
state.125 In other words, while (on its best day) the efficiency gap tells an
analyst that a map is biased in favor of one party, it does not tell the analyst
in which district (or districts) that bias originates.126 As Whitford holds, this
means that, even if an efficiency gap is evidence of partisan gerrymandering,
that does not on its own bestow standing on a plaintiff to challenge the map;
it allows her merely to state a “generalized grievance” that is by definition
incapable of supplying jurisdiction to a court.127
While the Whitford Court identified this problem as one of injury, it
might just as well be viewed as a problem of redressability.128 The efficiency
gap tells an analyst that there is a problem, but it does not tell her how to
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al., Flaws in the Efficiency Gap, 33 J. LAW & POL. 1, 2 (2017) (“The formula is simple and easy
to compute: in its simplified form, it can be calculated on the basis of two numbers, the proportions
of votes and seats won by a party.”).
122. But see Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 859–62 (W.D. Wisc. 2016) (summarizing
testimony of four experts who presented evidence of possible partisan bias in Wisconsin’s state
legislative map); Wang, supra note 11, at 382 (“In Whitford, the districting plan was evaluated
using a recently developed measure of asymmetry, the efficiency gap. Expert witness Prof. Simon
Jackman established the statistical properties of the efficiency gap in a presentation that included
36 figures. This report was challenged by the state’s expert witness, who focused on the question
of how much asymmetry came from population clustering; that expert was, in turn, counterchallenged.”).
123. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 837.
124. See Bernstein & Duchin, supra note 115, at 1022 (identifying numerous failings of the
efficiency gap, including that it “penalizes proportionality,” produces false positives in cases where
a party’s dominance exceeds 75 percent, and ultimately serves merely as a measure of deviation
from a principle of double-proportionality whose desirability the authors question). Professors
Chambers, Miller, and Sobel likewise point to several curiosities and contradictions internal to the
efficiency gap, which we do not endeavor to catalogue here, but which are worthy of our readers’
consideration. See generally Chambers et al., supra note 121.
125. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1930–31.
126. See id. at 1933.
127. Id. at 1931.
128. See id. at 1932 (noting that the lead plaintiff would remain in a noncompetitive district
on even the plaintiffs’ proposed map).
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solve it. Indeed, it does not even tell her whether any observed efficiency
gap is a function of intentional gerrymandering or an unavoidable
consequence of population distributions and partisan clustering.129 It is
possible, in other words, that in some states, a large efficiency gap may be
an incurable ill—and those without a remedy do not have standing, much
less a chance of prevailing on the merits.130
The efficiency gap also produces a result that might be considered
anomalous by a Supreme Court that is evidently concerned with identifying
a district-specific injury arising from vote dilution.131 Because the efficiency
gap, by its very nature, involves offsetting one party’s wasted votes against
the other’s, it permits a significant partisan advantage in one district to be
compensated for by a significant partisan advantage in another district for
the other party.132 Thus, in a ten-district state where half of the voters are
Republicans and the other half are Democrats, the efficiency gap is
essentially agnostic as between a plan that would create ten competitive
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129. “With geographically defined districts, the number of legislative seats that a party wins
is going to depend not only on the number of votes it receives but also on where its voters live. . . .
A measure like the [e]fficiency [g]ap, which implicitly dictates a particular relationship between
votes and seats, is therefore guaranteed to erroneously detect ‘gerrymandering’ under some
circumstances.” Pam Frost Gorder, You Can’t Tell a Gerrymandered District by Its Shape, OHIO
STATE NEWS (Oct. 25, 2017), https://news.osu.edu/you-cant-tell-a-gerrymandered-district-by-itsshape/ (quote attributed to Mira Bernstein, founding member of the Metric Geometry and
Gerrymandering Group at Tufts University); see also Cain, supra note 109, at 1533 (“Knowing that
plan A has a higher or lower efficiency gap score than plan B does not inform whether the score in
either plan is more likely to be produced by impermissible partisan gerrymandering. Without
knowing about the natural level of bias in any given geographic area, the scores are unreliable as
even a comparative measure of partisan bias.”); see also Kean, supra note 73; Sam Wang, The
Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/o
pinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of-2012.html (“Concentration of voters in urban areas can,
for example, limit how districts are drawn, creating a natural packing effect.”); Cohn & Bui, supra
note 120 (“Gerrymandering isn’t the only reason one party might ‘waste’ many more votes than
the other. Parties can naturally ‘pack’ or ‘crack’ themselves, simply because of how their voters
are distributed geographically. The efficiency gap doesn’t distinguish between votes wasted by
gerrymandering or by natural causes. That’s probably the biggest practical limitation of the
measure.”). This failing is one common to most every measure of partisan asymmetry proposed in
the academic literature. See, e.g., Grofman & King, supra note 3, at 7 (“The key to the symmetry
definition of fairness is that it evaluates the electoral system as a whole by evaluating how voter
preferences statewide are translated into the division of legislative seats between the parties.”
(emphasis added)); cf. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1931 (“The difficulty for standing purposes is that
these calculations are an average measure. They do not address the effect that a gerrymander has
on the votes of particular citizens. Partisan-asymmetry metrics such as the efficiency gap measure
something else entirely: the effect that a gerrymander has on the fortunes of political parties.”).
130. See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1931.
131. See id. at 1930.
132. See Chambers et al., supra note 121, at 3 (“[The efficiency gap] ignores political
heterogeneity within political parties and its application can strengthen extremists at the expense
of moderates. It can increase political polarization, and can make the weaker party—which the
efficiency gap attempts to protect—worse off.”).
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districts and one which would create five solidly blue and five solidly red
districts.133 That these two situations could be treated identically by the
purportedly talismanic test of partisan gerrymandering is more than a little
challenging to square with any claim of constitutional injury premised on a
principle of vote dilution, as the Court called for in Whitford.134
There are still other senses in which the efficiency gap’s purported
strengths betray yet greater weaknesses. Because it looks only at actual votes
in elections, the efficiency gap is slow to catch up to partisan bias. At a bare
minimum, the metric requires two election cycles to produce enough data to
make reliable claims about any map’s bias.135 As subsequent research has
also demonstrated, the efficiency gap is prone to serious swings from
election to election, which further diminishes its utility as a speedy assessor
of partisan bias.136 In addition, its focus on actual votes fails to take account
of the effect of gerrymandering on suppressing voter turnout.137 To the
extent, therefore, that the efficiency gap is understood to make predictive
claims about the outcome of future elections (i.e., that they too will involve
similar inefficiencies as elections past), it requires one to make the
assumption that party loyalty is relatively inelastic, an assumption that, while
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133. See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1931.
134. See id. This feature of the efficiency gap is not merely an academic problem; it ignores
the fact that voters in districts where there is insignificant inter-party competition will often be left
to choose in a party primary between highly partisan candidates who do not represent the majority
of the district, merely a majority (or perhaps only a plurality) of the majority caucus. See Chambers,
supra note 121, at 23–24 (“[T]he efficiency gap does not contemplate that political parties may be
heterogenous. This is a problem because gerrymandering can affect not only which parties are
elected, but also the specific political opinions of the representatives that comprise the
legislature. . . . [T]he measure can favor plans that make it easier for political extremists to be
elected, and which would naturally increase the level of political polarization in legislatures. More
importantly, in spite of its proposed application in adjudicating Equal Protection cases, the use of
the efficiency gap can actually harm the minority party.”).
135. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 887 (“[P]lans’ efficiency gaps vary
markedly from election to election. It thus is futile to insist on a gap of zero at any particular
moment, because in all likelihood the gap will have assumed a non-zero value by the time of the
next election.”); id. at 836 (“In many cases, in fact, a plan whose average gap favors one party will
feature a gap favoring the other party at some point during the decade.”).
136. See Cohn & Bui, supra note 120 (“The difference between the presidential election results
and congressional election results hints at another problem: The efficiency gap is very noisy. It can
shift back and forth from cycle to cycle. That’s mainly because the efficiency gap emphasizes the
difference between winning and losing a district. If you win by one vote, all of your opponents’
votes are wasted, and just one of yours; lose by one vote and the opposite is true. As a result, the
courts would probably need to look across many elections to assess whether a map is in violation.”).
137. Cf. Cohn & Bui, supra note 120 (“The efficiency gap isn’t great at measuring the one big
Democratic geography advantage: Hispanic districts. Here, the Democrats’ advantage is that they
can translate votes to seats at an efficient rate, thanks to the extremely low turnout-to-population
ratio of Hispanic areas, which, for good measure, are not always overwhelmingly Democratic. The
efficiency gap, if anything, gets this backward. It’s measuring wasted votes, after all, and the low
turnout of these districts means that the Republicans waste very few in Hispanic districts.”).
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it may be true today,138 has been too infrequently true historically to make it
a plausible constitutional norm.139 As its originators admit, an efficiency gap
in any single election is not enough to make an assumption of inherent
partisan bias, and thus they include a series of caveats which one must
employ before determining its usefulness.140
While the efficiency gap may still have promise as a tool for
demonstrating the effects of enduring partisan bias and entrenchment,
Whitford makes it clear that it is inadequate, standing on its own, to sustain
a claim of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.141 In the next section,
we propose an alternative, district-focused approach that would provide a
court an adequate basis to find an individualized injury-in-fact to a particular
voter, as well as permit the sort of apples-to-apples comparisons that made
the efficiency gap an attractive metric to begin with.142

III. Measuring Per-District Vote Dilution

12/07/2018 13:09:16

138. See Micah Altman, Modeling the Effect of Mandatory District Compactness on Partisan
Gerrymanders, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 989, 1000 (1998).
139. See Cain, supra note 109, at 1525 (“While it is a straightforward calculation to identify
seats-votes gaps at the end of a decade, it is more problematic to project them with a high degree
of certainty into the future when the districts lines have just been drawn.”).
140. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 847.
141. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1932 (2018).
142. See id. at 1935 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“The harm of vote dilution . . . arises when an
election practice—most commonly, the drawing of district lines—devalues one citizen’s vote as
compared to others.”).
143. See infra Part III.A.
144. See infra Part III.B.
145. See infra Part III.C.
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This section introduces and explains the metric we propose to answer
the challenge, set down in Whitford, of demonstrating a district-specific
injury from partisan gerrymandering: the “vote dilution index.” It begins by
setting forth a formula for calculating the index, which is equal to the
percentage of voters in a given district who, on a maximally competitive
map, could be drawn into a competitive district but have instead been drawn
into a district where there is a vanishingly small chance of their votes
affecting the outcome.143 Next, we illustrate the function and attributes of
the index using a simplified hypothetical state whose population is both
evenly distributed geographically and closely divided along partisan lines.144
We then put theory into practice by calculating the vote dilution index for
each of the country’s 435 Congressional districts and reporting our
findings.145 Finally, we discuss the advantages of the vote dilution index
over existing measures of partisan bias, with a focus on its unique ability to
isolate and identify the effects of partisan gerrymandering on individual
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legislative districts, all while fully accounting for the potential distorting
effects of geographic clustering.146
A. The Vote Dilution Index
To meet the demands of Whitford, we propose a new metric, which we
call the “vote dilution index,” that would permit plaintiffs to credibly claim,
and courts to properly find, a district-specific injury based upon partisan vote
dilution. Our metric answers the call of Whitford by providing a method of
assessing partisan gerrymandering not on a statewide basis, but on a districtby-district basis, and in a manner that accounts for the limitations imposed
by geographic clustering of members of one party.147 And, because it can be
calculated for any district, the vote dilution index also permits comparison
among districts and among maps.148
Although we explain our method in greater detail below, it will be
helpful for us to offer a definition of the vote dilution index at the outset.
The vote dilution index is expressed as the percentage of the voters149 in a
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146. See infra Part III.D.
147. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 862 (2016) (noting that defense expert in
district court proceeding could not “determine exactly how much of the [efficiency gap] was
attributable to geography.”).
148. See infra Part III.C and III.D.
149. In our application below, see infra Part III.C, we generally utilize the voting-age
population of a district as the best and most readily available approximation of the number of
registered and active voters in a particular district. Since the vote dilution index is expressed as a
percentage, however, its formula should produce similar results if other segments are studied, such
as total population or registered voter population, provided that those populations are as evenly
distributed in a given jurisdiction. Indeed, in our analysis below, where precinct-level voting age
population figures were not readily available, we have utilized total population to calculate the vote
dilution index. This was the case for the six states that have redistricted since the 2012 presidential
election: Arizona, California, Florida, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. In order to
include those districts in our population totals below, see infra Part III.C, we multiplied the vote
dilution index by the total voting-age population of the district in order to approximate the number
of voting-age individuals in each district whose voting power has been diminished as a result of
decisions by mapmakers.
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presently noncompetitive district150 that, on a maximally competitive map,151
would instead reside in a competitive district,152 or, more mathematically:
I = P lost
Ptotal
where Plost is the number of voters in each “safe” district who, on a maximally
competitive map, would be situated in a competitive district (the district’s
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150. We do not endeavor here to set in stone a definitive dividing line between of
“competitive” or “noncompetitive,” although we believe any reasonable definition of
competitiveness, at least in the context of federal Congressional elections, must give each major
party something close to a one-in-five chance of winning an election, since there will only be five
Congressional elections in the decade-long life of a map. In our application below, we utilize the
definition of competitiveness adopted in the models developed by FiveThirtyEight, which requires
that the minority party have at least an 18 percent chance of gaining control of the district over
time. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
In setting a proper threshold for “competitiveness,” one must select a definition that
separates genuinely competitive races from realistically noncompetitive ones. A district in which
there is a 95 percent chance of a party maintaining control is not practically different from a district
in which there is a 98 or 99 percent chance of the same result, at least for a map that will only
endure for five elections. For that reason, we do not propose a measure that would simply ask
whether voters could have been drawn into more or less competitive districts, but whether they can
be drawn into districts that meet a reasonable threshold of competitiveness. Cf. Grofman & King,
supra note 3, at 23 (“It somehow seems more heinous to prevent a majority from exercising its
mandate, then [sic] merely to exaggerate the size of a majority. Moreover, exaggerating the size
of a majority is virtually inevitable under plurality-based legislative elections because of electoral
responsiveness values above one (the bonus effect).”).
151. As with settling on a definition of competitiveness, see supra note 150, creating a
“maximally competitive map” is both a necessary first step in our methodology and an area where
reasonable minds may differ as to what constitutes such a map. As we explain below, infra note
187, we believe that the threshold selected by FiveThirtyEight (Cook PVI +5 for either party) is as
reasonable a definition of competitiveness as any other. But regardless, once the mapmaker selects
a threshold for separating competitive districts from noncompetitive districts, then the criteria for
creating such a map are clear. A map is “maximally competitive” under our definition if, for each
given state, it is not possible to create any more competitive districts than appear on the map while
adhering to presumptively mandatory traditional redistricting criteria such as contiguity and equal
population. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577–78 (1964) (requiring roughly equal
population among state legislative districts and recognizing contiguity as an acceptable principle);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (requiring equal population among federal Congressional
districts). Thus, assuming, as we do in our application of the methodology below, that a district
must have an approximately one-in-five chance of changing party control in order to be considered
competitive, then the maker of our “maximally” competitive must draw the districts’ lines in order
to maximize the number of districts that are at least that competitive. Because it satisfies this
criterion, FiveThirtyEight’s “highly competitive” map meets the definition of a “maximally
competitive map” and is therefore used in our application of our method below. See infra note 187.
152. See supra note 150 (discussing criteria for a proper measure of competitiveness).
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“population lost” to competitive districts), and Ptotal is the total number of
voters in the district.153
Thus, a district which is already competitive will have a vote dilution
index of zero.154 Similarly, a district which, though it is a safe district, has no
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153. We acknowledge that our methodology bears some resemblance to the “precinct
swapping” arguments made by the plaintiffs in Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001), a racial
gerrymandering case, although it has some significant differences. In Cromartie, the plaintiffs,
who had challenged a single district as being racially gerrymandered, presented the district court
with numerous examples of precincts in their district which could be swapped with precincts in
another district in order to promote racial balance while maintaining a similar degree of partisan
symmetry. Id. at 255–57. The district court did not address the plaintiffs’ “precinct swapping”
arguments, but found a racial gerrymander on other grounds. Id. at 255. The Supreme Court, in
reversing the district court, evaluated the plaintiffs’ precinct-swapping arguments as a possible
alternative basis to uphold the factual findings of the district court, which it had found to be clearly
erroneous. Id. at 257.
In each case, the Court found that the mapmakers (there, the legislature) could
satisfactorily have based each of their decisions not to swap precincts on traditional redistricting
criteria, and therefore, the Court said, there was not a sufficient basis to conclude that the decisions
were made based upon racial considerations. Id. at 255–56. Ultimately, the Court said, “a showing
that the legislature might have ‘swapped’ a handful of precincts out of a total of 154 precincts,
involving a population of a few hundred out of a total population of about half a million, cannot
significantly strengthen appellees’ case.” Id. at 256–57.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the Cromartie Court did not reject a
“precinct swapping” approach out-of-hand as an improper method for assessing vote dilution;
instead, it found that such an approach was not convincing under the specific facts of the case.
Critically, in reaching that conclusion, it pointed to the relatively negligible proportion of voters
who would have been affected (a number evidently less than two-tenths of one percent of the total
population of the district) as one of the major factors diminishing the persuasive power of such an
approach.
Thus, while a certain kind of “precinct swapping” occurs in the calculation of the vote
dilution index (in that it determines the degree of vote dilution by determining the number of voters
in each precinct who could, on a maximally competitive map, be “swapped” into a competitive
district), we believe that it is a substantially more powerful metric than a mere “precinct swapping”
approach. A “precinct swapping” approach may provide some evidence of purposeful
gerrymandering at a particular time and place, but the vote dilution index permits comparison of
the degree of vote dilution across districts and across time. It also has the advantage of using, as a
baseline, not a slightly rejiggered neighboring district, but a statewide map that has been designed
to maximize competitiveness. Thus, the vote dilution index allows us to determine not merely how
many voters in a district could be redrawn into an already-existing neighboring district, but how
many of those voters could be drawn into competitive districts overall. As a result, the vote dilution
index permits a court to readily distinguish the sort of de minimis effects observed in Cromartie
from the far more significant gerrymanders detected in our analysis below. See infra Part III.C.
154. That is true, because in our formula Plost is defined to include only voters who are currently
situated in safe districts but could be situated in competitive districts on a maximally competitive
map. Since voters in a competitive district are not currently situated in a safe district, Plost is zero
and the vote dilution index is likewise zero as a result. This result is consistent with the objectives
of our methodology, because a voter who already lives in a competitive district has not, by
definition, been “packed” or “cracked” into a district where his voting power has been substantially
reduced as a result of decisions by the mapmakers. But see infra note 169 (discussing the utility of
ascertaining a “negative” vote dilution index for voters who reside in a competitive district on the
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precincts that would be drawn into a competitive district on a maximally
competitive map likewise has a vote dilution index of zero.155 A district,
meanwhile, where all of the precincts could be, but are not, drawn into a
competitive district, would have a vote dilution index of 100.156 A vote
dilution index between zero and 100 reflects that some, but not all, of the
voters in that district could be drawn into a competitive district but have not
been.
Our method is based upon a comparison of two maps: (1) the current
map; and (2) an alternative map that has been drawn to maximize the number
of competitive contests.157 In our application of the methodology below, we
have used a map developed by Nate Silver and his colleagues at
FiveThirtyEight to maximize the number of competitive Congressional
districts,158 but our method can be applied using any alternative map
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current map but who would be situated in a noncompetitive district on a maximally competitive
map). On the most recent national Congressional map, there are 72 such districts. See infra note
201 and accompanying text.
155. That is true for similar reasons as in the case of a competitive district. See supra note
154. If a district is such that, even when a state map is drawn to maximize the number of
competitive districts, every voter in the district would still reside in a noncompetitive district, then
Plost is zero because there are no voters in the district who would be situated in a competitive district
even on a maximally competitive map, and the resulting vote dilution index is therefore zero.
Again, this fits with the objectives of the metric, since it can be reasonably assumed that the voters
residing in such a district reside in a noncompetitive district as a result of geography and not as a
result of any “packing” or “cracking” by mapmakers. On the most recent national Congressional
map, there are 53 such districts, seven of which are in single-district states. See infra note 202 and
accompanying text.
156. That result once again follows from a straightforward application of the formula we
present above. If literally ever voter residing in a presently noncompetitive district could, on a
maximally competitive map, be drawn into a competitive district, then each and every one of those
voters has a plausible basis to claim that the resulting diminishment in her voting power is traceable
to the decisions of the mapmakers. That showing is enough to satisfy the first two prongs of the
standing inquiry, and the fact that a maximally competitive map exists satisfies the third. See Gill
v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1936 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring). On the most recent national
Congressional map, there are 49 such districts. See infra notes 189–91 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 150–51 (discussing possible methodologies for developing such a map).
158. See infra Part II.C. Professor Cain and his colleagues question the wisdom of seeking to
identify a “single-but-elusive counterfactual” map that can be drawn according to any combination
of neutral (i.e., nonpartisan) criteria. See Cain, supra note 109, at 1536 (“Instead . . . the spectrum
of viable maps better constitutes the baselines or natural set of maps against which to compare the
observed map.”). While that critique may have force in the context of determining what degree of
partisan gerrymandering goes “too far,” we do not believe it is fatal to an approach like ours, which
seeks merely to identify the circumstances in which a plaintiff has standing to raise such a claim.
As the Court tells us in Whitford, to demonstrate standing in the context of a partisan vote dilution
case, a plaintiff must merely claim a diminution in voting power that is traceable to the decisions
of the mapmakers and which could be redressed by a hypothetical map. Given those requirements,
a maximally competitive map sets the best possible baseline to measure and compare the effects of
the mapmakers’ decisions in each existing district.
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designed to maximize the number of competitive contests.159 This
“maximally competitive map” is used in our method as a baseline to assess
the degree to which voters in each district are “cracked” or “packed” into
noncompetitive districts as a result of choices made by mapmakers.160
Our method next classifies the districts in each state as being either
“competitive” or “safe” (i.e., noncompetitive), based upon an assessment of
the likelihood that the district will change partisan control over time.161
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159. See supra notes 150–51 (discussing possible methodologies for developing such a map).
It is important to note that our analysis necessitates no claim that a maximally competitive map is
constitutionally required, or even desirable. Courts might well determine that something well short
of maximum competitiveness is required under the Constitution, and anti-gerrymandering
advocates on all sides may take different views of what goals should be achieved in an optimal
map. While our metric would also permit the current maps to be compared to those alternative
maps, our purpose in using a map that maximizes the number of competitive districts is to provide
a baseline for assessing the size of the voting population that is “cracked” or “packed” into
noncompetitive districts as a result of the choices that have been made by mapmakers.
160. We believe that a maximally competitive map provides the proper baseline by which to
measure partisan gerrymandering, for several reasons. First, unlike metrics that look merely at the
degree of partisan advantage in a particular district as compared to a statewide average, drawing a
maximally competitive map requires plaintiffs to take account of the limitations imposed by the
fact of geographic clustering. Studies show that such clustering has dramatically increased over
the course of the last several decades, and as a result it will literally be impossible in some regions
to produce a competitive district. See, e.g., Aaron Bycoffe et al., West Virginia - The Atlas of
Redistricting, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 25, 2018), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/redistrictingmaps/west-virginia/#Competitive (demonstrating that it is impossible to draw a competitive
Congressional district in the state of West Virginia). By using a maximally competitive map as the
baseline, analysts resist the temptation to ignore the geographical (and really, geometrical)
limitations imposed by the independent residential choices of voters.
Other might argue that the use of a maximally competitive map is an improper baseline
since such a map is highly unlikely to exist in reality, but such an argument badly misses the point.
As we note above, supra note 159, our methodology does not presume that a maximally competitive
map is even desirable, much less constitutionally required. But what a maximally competitive map
does is set the outward bound for how “unpacked” and “uncracked” a map can possibly be, and
thus it provides a proper starting point to assess how great a variation from that baseline is reflected
on a per-district basis.
Finally, it might be claimed that our metric is flawed in that there will not always be one
maximally competitive map, but rather multiple maps that may produce the same number of
competitive districts and thus, as a measure of vote dilution, it is too dependent on the particular
“maximally competitive map” that an analyst might draw. As an initial matter, we doubt that will
be the case very often as a result of the geographic clustering of voters. But even in a case where
that might be true, we do not believe the existence of an alternative “maximally competitive map”
would undermine a plaintiff’s showing of standing (although we grant that it might weaken the
plaintiff’s case on the merits). If a plaintiff residing in a safe district can show that it is possible to
draw even one maximally competitive map in which she would reside in a competitive district, then
she has shown both a plausible claim of injury traceable to the decisions of the mapmakers and a
possibility of redress. If it shown that she has not been the victim of unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering because, for example, the map nonetheless complies with traditional redistricting
criteria, that may mean she will not prevail, but it does not mean she lacks standing.
161. As described above, different analysts may adopt different thresholds, but so long as the
threshold adopted remains consistent through calculation of the vote dilution index, it will still
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produce results that permit useful comparison among districts and among maps. See supra note
150.
162. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
163. Since voting results are a reported on a precinct-by-precinct basis, it is the smallest
available data point that would permit assessment of the partisan voting patterns of any particular
geographic area. We therefore use precinct data as our unit of analysis.
164. See supra notes 149–53 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 149–53 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 149–53 and accompanying text.
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Again, in our application below, we have defined “competitive” in the same
way as FiveThirtyEight’s methodology uses the term—i.e., to reflect a
district in which each party has at least a roughly one-in-five chance of
winning control over the district, and thus where, on average, partisan control
would be expected to shift at least once during the decade-long life of the
map—but different applications of our method could use different thresholds
to distinguish “safe” districts from “competitive” ones.162 What is important
is that the method used to draw the alternative map use the same definition
of competitiveness that is then used to calculate each district’s vote dilution
index.163
Our next step is to determine, on each map, and for each voting precinct,
whether the precinct is in a safe district or a competitive one. If the precinct
is in a safe district on the current map and would likewise be in a safe district
on the maximally competitive map, it is discounted from the rest of the
analysis.164 This is because the voters in that precinct would not, even on the
most competitive possible map, be in a competitive district, and therefore it
cannot be said that they have been “cracked” or “packed” into a
noncompetitive district.165
Likewise, precincts that are already in
competitive districts are discounted, because they by definition have not
been placed in a safe district by the mapmakers.166
What is left, then, are precincts that experience a change in position
under the maximally competitive map, relative to the current map, e.g.,
precincts that are drawn into safe districts under the current map but which,
on the maximally competitive map, would instead be situated in a
competitive district.167 The sum of the voter populations of these precincts
forms the numerator for our formula, and, once divided by the total voter
population of the district, produces the district’s vote dilution index, i.e., the
percentage of voters in the district who have been drawn into a
noncompetitive district but who could, on a maximally competitive map, be
drawn into a competitive district instead. So long as the vote dilution index
is greater than zero, then there are at least some voters in the district who
could be drawn into a competitive district while increasing (in fact,
maximizing) the competitiveness of the state map overall, and who may
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therefore plausibly assert a redressable injury that is traceable to the conduct
of the mapmakers.168
While the greatest benefit of the vote dilution index is that it permits
evaluation and comparison of vote dilution on a per-district basis, the index
can also be calculated on a statewide basis. To do so, one simply sums the
numerators of the formula for each district (i.e. the total number of voters on
a statewide basis who, were the map drawn to maximize competitiveness,
would be moved from “safe” districts to competitive ones) and divides that
sum by the total number of voters in the state.169 Performing such an analysis
allows one to consider the extent to which each district contributes to vote
dilution on a statewide basis, as well as to compare the degree of statewide
vote dilution to the state’s efficiency gap or other statewide measures of
partisan asymmetry.170
B. Illustrating the Metric
To demonstrate the utility of the vote dilution index, let us proceed
through a simplified illustration of its application. Let us assume that there
is a district, which we shall call “District 1,” that contains four voting
precincts, which we will call Precincts A, B, C, and D.
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168. We do not claim, however, that a high vote dilution index necessarily reflects an invidious
intent on the part of the mapmakers to disempower voters generally, or to disadvantage partisans
of either political party in particular. Rather, the vote dilution index merely measures the effect of
the mapmakers’ decisions; it does not, standing alone, permit definitive conclusions about the
mapmakers’ purpose or intent (although it may be strong evidence thereof). Nor, as Whitford holds,
is such an inference necessary for plaintiffs to have standing to assert claims based on partisan
gerrymandering. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1932 (2018) (“[T]he question at this point
is whether the plaintiffs have established injury in fact. That turns on effect, not intent . . . .”).
169. In order to account for shifts in the opposite direction, one may also calculate the
“negative” vote dilution index by determining the number of voters who are currently situated in
competitive districts but would be moved into safe districts on a maximally competitive map.
Although some such shifts are inevitable in any redrawn map, they are negligible relative to the
number of voters that would move from safe to competitive districts. See infra note 183. Were
one to then subtract the negative vote dilution index for the state from the state’s vote dilution
index, she will then produce a “net” vote dilution index, which will reflect the net number of voters
who would see an increase in their voting power on a maximally competitive map.
170. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
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Figure 1. A hypothetical four-precinct district.
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Let us assume that there are two dominant political parties in the state,
which we will call the “White” party and the “Gray” party. Let us further
assume that the district is presently a noncompetitive district that favors the
“White” party, and, for the purpose of illustration only, that each of the
precincts has an equal voter population. Let us also assume that the
maximally competitive map for the state in which District 1 is situated would
include two more competitive districts than currently exist.
To determine the vote dilution index for District 1, we must determine
how many voters in the district would be drawn into a competitive district
on a maximally competitive map. To do this, we simply perform a precinctby-precinct comparison between the two maps. Let us assume that, on a
maximally competitive map, Precinct A is situated in a New District 1, which
would remain a “safe” district for the White party; that Precinct B is situated
in a New District 2, which would become a “safe” district for the Gray party;
that Precinct C is situated in a New District 3, which would become a
competitive district; and that Precinct D is situated in a New District 4, which
would likewise become a competitive district.
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Figure 2. An illustration of the districts into which our hypothetical precincts
would be drawn on a maximally competitive map.

See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
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171.
172.
173.
174.
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We now have all of the information we need in order to determine the
vote dilution index for District 1. Because Precinct A would remain in a
district that is “safe” for the White party on the maximally competitive map,
no voters in that precinct are added to the numerator of the formula.171
Likewise, the voters of Precinct B do not count towards the vote dilution
index, because even on a maximally competitive map, they will remain in a
safe district, albeit a district that is safe for the opposing party.172 The voters
of Precinct C and D, however, could, on a maximally competitive map, be
situated in competitive districts, and their numbers therefore do count
towards the vote dilution index.173 Given that each of the precincts has an
equal voter population, we can say that half of the voters in District 1 could
be drawn into a competitive district on a maximally competitive map, and
the vote dilution index of District 1 is therefore 50.174
An observant reader will note that the foregoing illustration in fact
included more information than was needed in order to determine the vote
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175. See supra notes 148–53 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 148–53 and accompanying text.
178. While we have chosen a round number to simplify the illustration, it is not far from the
true voting age population of the average Congressional district in the United States, which hovers
around 540,000. The average voting age population of a Congressional district in South Carolina,
in fact, is almost exactly 500,000.
179. This is of course a highly unrealistic assumption, but we make it nonetheless for the
purpose of illustration. See Cain et al., supra note 109, at 1530 (“Partisans are not randomly
dispersed across geography. Rather they cluster in nonrandom ways, causing redistricting to
produce natural partisan bias.”).
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dilution index for our hypothetical district. That is because we identified the
direction of the partisan advantage (i.e., towards the White party or the Gray
party) for each district in question. As far as the vote dilution index is
concerned, that fact is irrelevant.175 All that matters to the calculation is
whether the relevant districts are competitive or noncompetitive, not which
party is favored. This reflects the reality that vote dilution can occur either
by “cracking” or “packing,” and that each may produce a similar dilutive
effect.176
The example of Precinct B above is therefore illustrative, in that the
voters of Precinct B, even though they reside in a safe White district and
would reside on a safe Gray district on a maximally competitive map and
thus would experience a change in which party controlled their
Congressional district, they do not count towards the vote dilution index
because their voting power would not increase on the maximally competitive
map: they are still fated to elect a politician from the dominant political party
in their district. While they may currently be “packed” into a safe White
district and would, on a maximally competitive map, be “cracked” into a safe
“Gray” district, in either case they lack any substantial power to affect the
outcome of an election in their district.177
Now let us provide a slightly more complex explanation by illustrating
the vote dilution index in the context of a hypothetical state redistricting plan.
Take a state that has been divided into five Congressional districts.178 Let us
assume that each district contains four precincts with voter populations of
125,000 apiece, which we depict below as squares, and that the population
is evenly distributed throughout the state.179 Let us further assume that, on
the current Congressional map, two of the districts are “safe” districts for the
White party; two are “safe” for the Gray party; and one is a competitive
district. In the figure below, the color of each square reflects the fact that the
corresponding party enjoys a dominant advantage in each such region.
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Figure 3. A hypothetical state composed of five districts. Regions shaded in
gray are dominated by the Gray party.
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Now let us further assume that, if one were to redraw the map to
maximize the number of competitive districts, it would be possible to create
four competitive districts and one safe White district, like so:
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Figure 4. A maximally competitive map drawn on the same territory
shown in Figure 3.
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180. The fact that, in our illustration, both District 1 and District 2 have vote dilution indices
of 100, despite being controlled by different parties, points up the fact that the vote dilution index
is focused on the degree of competitiveness and exhibits no preference towards producing maps
that favor one party over another.
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We now have all the information we need in order to be able to
determine the vote dilution index for each of the existing Congressional
districts. Let us begin by examining Districts 1 and 2. Districts 1 and 2 are
districts that are “safe” districts for White and Gray, respectively. On the
maximally competitive map, however, the entire population of each district
would instead reside in a competitive district. Thus, the vote dilution index
for both District 1 and District 2 is 100.180
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Figure 5. A figure reflecting that the entire population of both District 1 and
District 2 could be situated in a competitive district on a maximally competitive map.

In the case of District 3, however, it is not possible to situate its entire
population in a competitive district on a maximally competitive map.
Although three quarters of the population is situated in a competitive district
(New District 3) on the maximally competitive map, one quarter of the
population is situated in a District 5 on the maximally competitive map, a
district that is safe for White. Thus, since only three quarters of the population
of District 3 would be situated in a competitive district on a maximally
competitive map, the vote dilution index of District 3 is 75.181

12/07/2018 13:09:16

181. Note that it is irrelevant to the calculation of the vote dilution index that the quarter of voters
who are in noncompetitive districts on both maps are in a district that is “safe” for Gray on the existing
map, but would be in a district that is “safe” for White on the maximally competitive map. That is
because, in either case, their votes do not stand a realistic chance of affecting the outcome of the
election, and therefore it cannot be said that their voting power has been measurably diminished by
the decisions of mapmakers.
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Figure 6. A figure reflecting that only three quarters of the population of
District 3 would be in a competitive district on a maximally competitive map.
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A similar analysis applies in the case of District 4, which is a safe
district for White on the current map. On a maximally competitive map, half
of the population of District 4 would be resituated into either New District 3
or New District 4, each of which is a competitive district. The remaining
half of its population, however, would be situated in New District 5, which
is a safe district for White. Thus, since only half of the population of District
4 would be situated in a competitive district on a maximally competitive
map, the vote dilution index of District 4 is 50.

Figure 7. A figure demonstrating that only half the population of District 4
would be situated in a competitive district on a maximally competitive map.

12/07/2018 13:09:16

182. At first blush, it may seem surprising that the vote dilution index does not pick up that a
quarter of the population of District 5, which is competitive on the current map, would be moved
into a safe White district on a maximally competitive map, and thus, the voters in District 5 would
in fact receive a diminution in voting power if the map were drawn to maximize competition. As
counterintuitive as it may seem, we believe this outcome is appropriate. The vote dilution index is
our attempt to identify the number of voters in a given district whose voting power has been
substantially diminished as a result of decisions by the mapmakers. Since, in an already-
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Finally, let us examine the case of District 5. On a maximally
competitive map, three quarters of the population of District 5 would be
situated in a competitive district, New District 4. One quarter of the
population would move to New District 5, which is a safe district for White.
Since, however, District 5 is already a competitive district on the current
map, its vote dilution index is 0 because there are no voters in District 5 who
are currently situated in a noncompetitive district.182
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Figure 8. A figure demonstrating that one quarter of the population of
District 5 would be situated in a safe district on a maximally competitive map.

12/07/2018 13:09:16

competitive district, there are no such voters, it makes sense that the vote dilution index should be
zero for such districts.
If, however, one wished to use a similar method to measure the impact that drawing a
particular map to be more competitive would have on an already-competitive district, our method
could be easily adapted to that end. One would simply calculate the total voting age population in
each competitive district that, on a maximally competitive map, would be situated in a safe district
or districts. We believe that, for the sake of clarity, this number should be expressed as a negative.
Thus, in the example above, District 5 would have a vote dilution index of -25.
We did in fact calculate these numbers in order to net them out of our statewide
calculations of the vote dilution index. See infra notes 207–15 and accompanying text. As
discussed therein, however, only 41 Congressional districts have negative vote dilution indices
under this calculus, and on a statewide basis, most states experience only a negligible decrease in
their vote dilution indices when their negative vote dilution indices are factored in. In other words,
in all states where negative vote dilution indices were observed, there are significantly more voters
who could be placed into competitive districts who have instead been drawn into safe districts, than
there are voters who would be shifted of competitive districts into safe ones on a maximally
competitive map.
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Looking at the entire state map, we are also able to calculate the
statewide vote dilution index by calculating the percentage of the total
population of the state that is situated in a safe district but would be situated
in a competitive district on a maximally competitive map. Forty percent of
the state’s voter population lives in Districts 1 and 2, which both have a vote
dilution index of 100. Three-quarters of the population of District 3 (a safe
district) would likewise be situated in a competitive district on a maximally
competitive map, and those voters make up 15 percent of the state’s total
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voter population. Likewise, half of the population of District 4 would be
situated in a competitive district on a maximally competitive map, and those
voters constitute an additional 10 percent of the state’s total population.
Thus, since slightly less than two-thirds of the state’s population could have
been drawn into a competitive district but has instead been drawn into a safe
district for either White or Gray, the statewide vote dilution index is 65.183
Although this illustration involves a number of simplifying
assumptions for the sake of demonstration, it highlights the intuitiveness and
practicality of our proposed metric. Simply by determining the percentage
of the voter population of a given district that, on a maximally competitive
map, could instead be located in a competitive district, one can produce a
single metric that permits comparison of districts both to each other and to
the maximally competitive map.184 As the illustration further demonstrates,
a district’s vote dilution index can be decreased either by “unpacking” the
district—i.e., by moving majority voters in one district into a more
competitive district—or by “uncracking” it—i.e., by doing the same for
minority voters in that same district.185 Again, the point is not that a
maximally competitive map is necessarily ideal, but rather that, by
comparing any given map to the maximally competitive map, we can assess
the degree to which the lack of competitiveness in any particular district is a
function of decisions made by mapmakers (and not merely a function of
geography).186
C. Applying the Metric
We have calculated the vote dilution index for each of the United
States’ 435 Congressional districts using the methodology set forth above,
using data culled from U.S. Census Bureau data and FiveThirtyEight’s
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 72 Side B
12/07/2018 13:09:16

183. As we explain above, see supra note 182 and accompanying text, we have also developed
metrics that we call the “negative” and “net” vote dilution indices, which account for the number
of voters in competitive districts who would be drawn into noncompetitive districts if the maximally
competitive map were adopted. Since, in the illustration above, one quarter of the population of
District 5 (a competitive district) would be placed in a noncompetitive district on the maximally
competitive map and that population represents five percent of the total population of the state, the
“negative” vote dilution index of the maximally competitive map is -5 and the “net” vote dilution
index is therefore 60.
184. See infra Part III.C.
185. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1931 (2018) (“Remedying the individual voter’s
harm . . . does not necessarily require restructuring all of the State’s legislative districts. It requires
revising only such districts as are necessary to reshape the voter’s district—so that the voter may
be unpacked or uncracked, as the case may be.”).
186. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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publicly accessible data set.187 The results of that analysis are depicted in
the Appendix hereto.188 A few of the more salient findings are reported here.
Forty-nine Congressional districts yielded a vote dilution index of 100.
That means that, in 49 of the 435 Congressional districts, literally every voter
in the district could be drawn into a competitive district if the state’s map
were drawn to maximize the number of competitive districts.189 These 49
districts comprehend approximately 27 million voting-age individuals, more
than 11 percent of the total voting-age population of the United States.190
Twenty-seven such districts have been drawn to favor Democrats; 22 to
favor Republicans.191
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187. In utilizing FiveThirtyEight’s model, we adopt, for purposes of our analysis,
FiveThirtyEight’s definition of competitiveness, which requires that each major party have at least
an 18 percent of gaining the seat over time, an assessment reached by reference to the Cook Partisan
Voter Index (PVI) for the district. See Aaron Bycoffe et al., We Drew 2,568 Congressional
Districts by Hand. Here’s How., FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 25, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/feat
ures/we-drew-2568-congressional-districts-by-hand-heres-how/ (“The probabilities of electing a
Democrat or Republican are based on how often seats with a given Cook PVI elected members of
each party between 2006 and 2016. They reflect a seat’s expected performance over the long run,
across a variety of political conditions. They are not predictions for the 2018 election,
specifically.”). To express that concept in the more traditional frame of the Cook Partisan Voter
Index (PVI), a noncompetitive district is one where the PVI is greater than +5 for either party.
Bycoffe et al., supra; David Wasserman & Ally Flinn, The Cook Partisan Voting Index for the
115th Congress, COOK POLITICAL REPORT (2017), https://adobeindd.com/view/publications/
76a932db-5c64-472a-b201-6534a25a6d03/1/publication-web-resources/pdf/PVI_Doc.pdf (“[T]he
Cook PVI measures how each district performs at the presidential level compared to the nation as
a whole. . . . A Partisan Voting Index score of D+2, for example, means that in the 2012 and 2016
presidential elections, that district performed an average of two points more Democratic than the
nation did as a whole, while an R+4 means the district performed four points more Republican than
the national average. If a district performed within half a point of the national average in either
direction, we assign it a score of EVEN.”).
We believe this a fair threshold for distinguishing competitive from noncompetitive
districts, although we might prefer a probability closer to 20 percent, to mirror the number of
Congressional elections to be held over the life of the map. See supra notes 150–51. Were that or
a different threshold for competitiveness set, it is possible that the voter dilution index would
produce different raw numbers. But once an analyst sets such a threshold and creates a map that
maximizes the number of competitive districts under her definition, the methodology described
above will still be available to permit that analyst to compare the degree of vote dilution across all
districts on the current map. See supra notes 150–51 (presenting criteria for creation of maximally
competitive map). Because FiveThirtyEight’s “promote competitive elections” map is designed to
maximize the number of districts that are competitive under the foregoing definition, it meets our
definition of a “maximally competitive map.” See supra note 151.
188. See infra app. tbl.1 (Nonzero Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts,
Ranked).
189. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
190. Based upon data from the U.S. Census Bureau. See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2018) [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU].
191. See infra app. tbl.1 (Nonzero Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts,
Ranked).
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An additional 261 Congressional districts have nonzero vote dilution
indices less than 100, meaning that at least some (but not all) voters in the
district have been drawn into “safe” districts, where they would instead be
situated in a competitive district on a maximally competitive map.192
Republicans are favored in 138 of these districts; Democrats in 123.193 The
total voting-age population of these districts is approximately 140 million
people, approximately half of whom would reside in a competitive district
on their state’s most competitive possible map.194 When combined with the
voting-age population of the Congressional districts with vote dilution
indices of 100, that produces a total of 97 million voting-age individuals who
are living in safe districts but who could instead be living in competitive
districts, a number representing almost exactly a third of the voting-age
population of the United States.195
Vote dilution indices higher than 50 occurred in 126 of the 261 districts
with nonzero vote dilution indices less than 100.196 That means that, in 175
of the 435 Congressional districts in the United States, more than half the
voting-age population could be drawn into a competitive district but has
instead has been drawn into a “safe” district.197 More than 77 million votingage individuals residing in those districts could be drawn into competitive
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192. See infra app. tbl.1 (Nonzero Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts,
Ranked).
193. One should not misread these and similar findings to suggest that partisan
gerrymandering necessarily favors one party over the other. A district may be safely Republican
because the Republicans have successfully cracked Democratic clusters into multiple districts—
but it may also be the case that the Democrats successfully packed the district with Republican
voters in order to reduce their ability to influence elections in other districts. Indeed, what the vote
dilution index may show most powerfully is that the parties have sometimes conspired to draw both
safe Republican districts and safe Democratic districts where competitive districts are possible,
with a resulting loss of voting power for voters in “safe” districts, regardless of the party who claims
the advantage in any one of them. See Christopher Ingraham, America’s Most Gerrymandered
Districts, WASH. POST (May 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/201
4/05/15/americas-most-gerrymandered-congressional-districts (“Contrary to one popular
misconception about the practice, the point of gerrymandering isn’t to draw yourself a collection
of overwhelmingly safe seats. Rather, it’s to give your opponents a small number of safe seats,
while drawing yourself a larger number of seats that are not quite as safe, but that you can expect
to win comfortably. . . . [T]he point of gerrymandering isn’t to draw yourself a safe seat but to put
your opponents in safe seats by cramming all of their supporters into a small number of districts.
This lets you spread your own supporters over a larger number of districts.”).
194. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 190.
195. supraId.
196. See infra app. tbl.1 (Nonzero Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts,
Ranked); see also supra note 193 (discussing implications of such partisan analysis).
197. See infra app. tbl.1 (Nonzero Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts,
Ranked).
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198. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 190.
199. See infra app. tbl.1 (Nonzero Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts,
Ranked).
200. See infra app. tbl.2 (Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts by Rank).
201. See Aaron Bycoffe et al., The Atlas of Redistricting, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/redistricting-maps/.
202. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
203. See infra app. tbl.2 (Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts by Rank); app.
tbls. 4–7 (Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts, Ranks 1–300).
204. See infra app. tbls.3–4 (Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts, Ranks 1–
150).
205. See infra app. tbls.4–7 (Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts, Ranks 51–
300); see also supra note 193 (discussing implications of such partisan analysis).
206. See supra notes 191, 199 and accompanying text; see also supra note 193 (discussing
implications of such partisan analysis).
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districts.198 One hundred and three of the 174 districts in this category have
been drawn to favor Republicans; 71 to favor Democrats.199
In only 115 of the 435 Congressional districts was the vote dilution
index found to be zero.200 Seventy-two of those districts had a vote dilution
index of zero because they were already deemed competitive under
FiveThirtyEight’s model.201 The remaining 43 districts achieved a vote
dilution index of 0 because they are geographically situated in such a way
that, even if their state’s map were redrawn to maximize competitiveness,
none of the voters in that district would find themselves in a competitive
district.202 Seven of those districts are the at-large districts of Alaska,
Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming,
each of which is represented in Congress by a single representative whose
district covers the whole state.
Among the districts with positive vote dilution indices under 100, the
degree of vote dilution showed little clustering, with a more-or-less straightline relationship between the vote dilution index of a district and its rank
among the districts.203 Likewise, there appears to be only minimal
correlation between which party controls a given district and the degree of
vote dilution present in the district. Among districts with vote dilution
indices above 80, the number of safe Democratic districts is nearly equal to
the number of safe Republican districts.204 For those with nonzero vote
dilution indices below 80, Democratic districts tend to have lower vote
dilution indices than Republican districts, and there are fewer such
Democratic districts overall.205 As noted above, however, there are five
more Democratic districts that have vote dilutions indices of 100 than
Republican districts, but there are many more Republican districts than
Democratic districts whose vote dilution indices are less than 100 and more
than zero.206
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207. See infra app. tbl.8 (Vote Dilution Index by State, Ranked).
208. These states are Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and
Wyoming. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
209. See infra app. tbl.8 (Vote Dilution Index by State, Ranked).
210. See infra app. tbl.8 (Vote Dilution Index by State, Ranked).
211. See infra app. tbl.8 (Vote Dilution Index by State, Ranked).
212. See infra app. tbl.8 (Vote Dilution Index by State, Ranked).
213. See infra app. tbl.8 (Vote Dilution Index by State, Ranked).
214. See infra app. tbl.8 (Vote Dilution Index by State, Ranked).
215. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 190.
216. Id.
217. See infra app. tbl.1 (Nonzero Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts,
Ranked); supra notes 190, 194 and accompanying text.
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We also calculated the vote dilution index for each state.207 In addition
to the seven single-district states (whose vote dilution index is zero by
definition),208 five other states achieved vote dilution indices of zero: Hawaii,
Iowa, Idaho, New Hampshire and West Virginia.209 Nebraska’s vote dilution
index was only slightly worse, at 1.8.210 Of the remaining 37 states, 35 have
vote dilution indices of 20 or more, meaning that, in those 35 states, fully
one-fifth of the voters in the state have been drawn into noncompetitive
districts who could instead be drawn into competitive districts.211 The
highest vote dilution index by far belongs to North Carolina, whose vote
dilution index of 77.3 is more than 11 points higher than the next closest
contender.212 Fifteen states have vote dilution indices of 50 or more, and the
median vote dilution index across all multi-district states is 35.9.213
Notably, on a nationwide basis, redrawing the maps to maximize the
number of competitive districts would not result in any voters being moved
from competitive districts into safe ones in 21 of the 38 states whose maps
can be made more competitive, and on a nationwide basis the percentage of
voters who would suffer such a fate is only 1.1 percent.214 On a nationwide
basis, if one were to implement the maximally competitive map,
approximately 94 million voters who live today in safe districts would live
in competitive ones, whereas only approximately 2.4 million voters would
be moved in the other direction.215
According to FiveThirtyEight’s model, approximately 82 percent of the
American public live in “safe” Congressional districts—districts where it is
unlikely that party control of the district will change over the decade-long
life of the map.216 Thanks to the vote dilution index, we can not only say
that it is possible to draw nearly half of these voters into competitive districts,
but also, for each existing district, exactly how many voters could be so
drawn.217 We believe that this analysis provides the clearest picture available
of the degree to which the decisions of mapmakers have diluted the power

40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 75 Side A

12/07/2018 13:09:16

FINNERAN_USE THIS ONE FINAL 12.7.18 (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2019]

FILLING THE GAP IN THE EFFICIENCY GAP

12/7/2018 10:40 AM

429

of voters to select their representatives, the very proof the Whitford Court
required for a partisan gerrymandering case to go forward.218
D. The Advantages of the Vote Dilution Index
Unlike the efficiency gap, the vote dilution index allows a plaintiff to
make a district-specific prima facie showing of partisan vote dilution that
should be adequate to survive a motion for summary judgment on standing
grounds.219 Our metric drives directly at the alleged injury that underlies a
vote dilution claim: that an individual voter, by virtue of her placement in a
particular legislative district, has significantly less power to affect the
outcome of elections than she would if the map had been drawn to make the
districts more competitive.220 Importantly, our metric does not seek simply
to compare her voting power to the voting power of a voter elsewhere in the
state, since even a map that is drawn to maximize competitiveness will not
create totally equal voting power among all voters due to the geographic
clustering of voters of either party.221 Likewise, our method does not entail
a claim that it is constitutionally necessary that a map be drawn to maximize
the voting power of any particular voter; instead, it simply provides a
baseline to judge whether or not a particular voter would see an increase in
her voting power if the district been drawn to make its elections more
competitive.222 As such, the vote dilution index does something that no
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218. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930 (2018).
219. See supra Part II.A.
220. See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1931 (noting that vote dilution claims arise “from the particular
composition of the voter’s own district, which causes his vote . . . to carry less weight than it would
carry in another, hypothetical district”); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986) (finding
constitutionally suspect an “electoral system [that] substantially disadvantages certain voters in
their opportunity to influence the political process effectively”).
221. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1925 (reciting testimony of experts that “efficiency gaps alone are
unreliable measures of durable partisan advantage, and that the political geography of Wisconsin
currently favors Republicans because Democrats—who tend to be clustered in large cities—are
inefficiently distributed in many parts of Wisconsin for purposes of winning elections”); see also
Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 859 (acknowledging that “the geographic distributions
of the parties’ supporters are highly heterogeneous”); id. at 894 (“[I]n many urbanized states,
Democrats are highly clustered in dense central city areas, while Republicans are scattered more
evenly through the suburban, exurban, and rural periphery.” (quoting Jowei Chen & Jonathan
Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures,
8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 241 (2013)); id. at 884–85 (suggesting that, to solve this problem, “states
whose plans have efficiency gaps above [the authors’ desired] thresholds would have the chance to
show that the gaps . . . were inevitable due to the states’ underlying political geography” and
acknowledging that, if “plans with gaps below the thresholds . . . could not be drawn at all, then
there would be no constitutional violation”); see also Clemens Puppe & Atilla Tasnádi, Optimal
Redistricting Under Geographical Constraints: Why “Pack and Crack” Does Not Work, 105
ECON. LETTERS 93 (2009).
222. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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previously developed metric has been capable of doing: it permits a plaintiff
to assert a personal injury arising from a legislature’s decision to draw her
into a less competitive district than she could otherwise have been placed,
while accounting for the geographical limitations arising from the
requirement of contiguity and the pervasiveness of partisan clustering.223
While we believe these features of the vote dilution index are sufficient
to solve the problem identified by the Court in Whitford,224 our metric has
other salient advantages as well. First, unlike the efficiency gap, our metric
does not allow a voter’s diminution in voting power to be compensated for
by another voter’s corresponding change in voting power elsewhere in the
state.225 Instead, the vote dilution index compares a voter’s present district
on the map with the district she would be in if the map had been drawn to
maximize the number of competitive districts in the state—i.e., to minimize
gerrymandering.226
An additional (and we believe positive) feature of our methodology is
that it permits a voter to assert a personal injury even if the party with which
she identifies controls the district into which she has been drawn, or even if
she does not identify with any party at all.227 That is because the injury she
asserts is not merely that her party is unable to gain control of the district in
which she resides (a claim that would not be available in any “packed”
district), but that her own power to affect that outcome has been diminished
to a greater degree than it would be if the map had been drawn to increase
(and indeed, to maximize) its competitiveness—in other words, that her
power to change which party she votes for (i.e., her right to vote) has been
rendered inconsequential by the decisions of the mapmakers.228 Thus, the
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223. See infra note 239 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Ingraham, supra note 193; see also
Aaron Blake, Name That District Contest Winner: ‘Goofy Kicking Donald Duck’, WASH. POST
(Dec. 29, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/name-that-district-contestwinner-goofy-kicking-donald-duck/2011/12/29/gIQA2Fa2OP_blog.html (awarding a free T-shirt
to a reader who dubbed Pennsylvania’s Seventh Congressional District “Goofy Kicking Donald
Duck”); see also Trip Gabriel, In Comically Drawn Pennsylvania District, the Voters Are Not
Amused, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/us/pennsylvaniagerrymander-goofy- district.html.
224. See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1921 (“A plaintiff who complains of gerrymandering, but who
does not live in a gerrymandered district, ‘assert[s] only a generalized grievance against
governmental conduct of which he or she does not approve.’” (quoting United States v. Hays, 515
U.S. 737, 745 (1995))).
225. See supra note 133 and accompanying text; Bernstein & Duchin, supra note 115, at 1021
(noting that “a lot of packing and cracking . . . is not penalized by [the efficiency gap if] it happens
symmetrically to voters of both parties.”).
226. See supra notes 148–53 and accompanying text.
227. Cf. Hays, 515 U.S. at 745 (holding that a plaintiff must reside in an allegedly
gerrymandered district in order to bring a racial gerrymandering claim).
228. See supra notes 148–53 and accompanying text; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at
24–25, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (remarks of Ginsburg, J.) (“[I]f you can stack a
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vote dilution index allows a plaintiff to assert a personal injury that results
either from “cracking,” in which a voter has been placed into a district where
she is a member of a hopelessly weak minority, or from “packing,” in which
a voter has been placed into a district where she is part of a thoroughly
entrenched majority.229
Our metric also serves the useful function of helping to readily
disqualify claims by plaintiffs who live in districts that are already
competitive, as well as those who, regardless of how the map is drawn, will
not be situated in a competitive district (since those districts will have a vote
dilution index of zero).230 As such, it limits the class of plaintiffs who might
plausibly seek relief to those for whom there is not only an injury-in-fact, but
a possibility that their injuries can be redressed, which is a separate and
distinct element of the standing inquiry.231 In addition, although the vote
dilution index does not, on its own terms, admit of any necessary dividing
line between what makes for a cognizable injury (or for unconstitutional
gerrymandering) and what does not, it produces a full spectrum of results
that permits comparison of the degree of gerrymandering to whatever
threshold a court might set as being within permitted tolerance.232 Similarly,
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legislature in this way, what incentive is there for a voter to exercise his vote? Whether it’s a
Democratic district or a Republican district, . . . using this map, the result is preordained in most of
the districts. . . . [W]hat becomes of the precious right to vote? Would we have that result when the
individual citizen says: I have no choice, I’m in this district, and we know how this district is going
to come out? . . . [T]hat’s something that this society should be concerned about.”).
229. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
230. See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1921 (“A plaintiff who complains of gerrymandering, but who
does not live in a gerrymandered district, ‘assert[s] only a generalized grievance against
governmental conduct of which he or she does not approve.’” (quoting Hays, 515 U.S. at 745)); see
also id. at 1935 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“To have standing to bring a partisan gerrymandering
claim based on vote dilution, . . . a plaintiff must prove that the value of her own vote has been
‘contract[ed].’” (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964))).
231. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (requiring a plaintiff to show
that she (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision).
232. If, for example, a court were to hold that no cognizable injury arises where a partisan
advantage is only “incidental,” then it could set a minimum vote dilution index of 10, or 15, or 20
that must be demonstrated before it would recognize a claim. We do not, however, believe such
an approach would be advisable, at least with respect to the question of Article III standing. In our
view, as long as a voter can demonstrate (1) that she votes in a precinct that, on a maximally
competitive map, would be situated in a competitive district and (2) that her current district is not
competitive, she has demonstrated both a plausible injury-in-fact traceable to the conduct of the
mapmakers and a possibility of redress that is adequate to convey Article III standing. See
Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1936 (Kagan, J., concurring). The vote dilution index, however, serves to
meet the requirement of Whitford that the injury asserted must be district-specific, as well as to
measure the degree to which the district has been systematically drawn to decrease inter-party
competition. See Wang, supra note 11, at 369–70 (“In gerrymandered districts, the noncompetitive
nature of the general election leaves the primary election as the only avenue for voters to affect
their representation. . . . Since partisan gerrymandering creates noncompetitive districts for both
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it permits comparison of vote dilution in one district to vote dilution in other
districts, both within a state and elsewhere in the country, thereby permitting
courts to assess how great an outlier the degree of vote dilution may be in
any particular district.233
We acknowledge that, as the origin of its name suggests,
“gerrymandering” ordinarily refers to the drawing of oddly shaped districts
for the purpose of creating partisan advantage.234 Our approach, we must
admit, assigns no value to the regularity or irregularity of the shape of a
district in geographical terms, and thus it may assign even relatively regular,
compact districts a high vote dilution index,235 and likewise may give an
oddly shaped district a vote dilution index that is low or even zero.236 But
we believe this outcome is appropriate, for several reasons.
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parties, voters on both sides may potentially feel the chill.”); Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1940 (Kagan,
J., concurring) (noting the view of a group of state legislators that partisan gerrymandering has
“sounded the death-knell of bipartisanship” (citing Brief for Bipartisan Group of 65 Current and
Former State Legislators as Amici Curiae, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161))).
233. See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1935 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“The harm of vote dilution . . .
arises when an election practice—most commonly, the drawing of district lines—devalues one
citizen’s vote as compared to others.”).
234. See Nic Cavell, Gerrymandering Is Even More Infuriating When You Can Actually See
It, WIRED (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/gerrymandering-is-even-more-infuriati
ng-when-you-can-actually-see-it/.
235. The statewide map of Indiana helps to illustrate the point. Indiana, whose statewide vote
dilution index is the ninth-worst in the country at 55.6, has been drawn to create two reliably
Democratic districts surrounding Gary and Indianapolis, with the remaining seven districts being
reliably Republican. See Aaron Bycoffe, et al., Indiana - The Atlas of Redistricting,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 25, 2018), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/redistricting-maps/indiana/
/redistricting-maps/indiana/. A maximally competitive map for Indiana, however, would contain
only four safe Republican districts, leaving the remaining five districts competitive. In order to
produce such an outcome, the entire population of the First Congressional District, which contains
Gary, would be placed in a competitive district, as would 97.1 percent of the population of the
Seventh Congressional District, which contains Indianapolis. Thus, despite their compactness and
regular shape, the First and Seventh Congressional Districts have vote dilution indices of 100 and
97.1, respectively.
236. Consider, for example, West Virginia’s Third Congressional District, which spans nearly
the length of the state and has a relatively contorted shape. It nonetheless has a vote dilution index
of zero because there is no conceivable map of West Virginia that would produce even a single
competitive district, and thus the map cannot be said to have caused any meaningful degree of vote
dilution. See Aaron Bycoffe et al., West Virginia - The Atlas of Redistricting, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Jan. 25, 2018), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/redistricting-maps/west-virginia/. Likewise, a
district like Illinois’s Sixth Congressional District, whose shape may look bizarre, has a vote
dilution index of zero because its shape produces a highly competitive district in which Republicans
have a nearly 40 percent chance of prevailing. See Aaron Bycoffe et al., Illinois - The Atlas of
Redistricting, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 25, 2018), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/redistrictingmaps/illinois/; see also Tim Jones & Patrick Judge, Illinois’ Political Map Rigging Takes Back Seat
to Wisconsin, Others, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.chicagobusines
s.com/article/20170829/NEWS02/170829860/wisconsin-gerrymandering-case-offers-little-hopefor-illinois-gop.
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First, mapmakers do not draw districts shaped like salamanders, or
praying mantises, or “Goofy kicking Donald Duck”237 for the hell of it; in
most cases, they do so in order to produce anticompetitive effects either
within the district or across the state as a whole.238 Using simple geography
as a method of identifying the competitiveness of any particular district is
therefore too facile an approach: it is political geography (i.e., the
geographical distribution of partisan preference across a population) that
determines whether or not a particular district map has an anticompetitive
purpose or effect.239
But more importantly, vote dilution is often achieved by maximizing
the compactness of a particular district, and a proper metric should therefore
capture vote dilution in regularly and irregularly shaped districts alike.240
We see no reason why, at least as far as her standing is concerned, a voter
may not claim a traceable injury just as well from her vote being diluted as
a result of her having been “packed” into a compact but noncompetitive
district as she might from her having been “cracked” into a noncompetitive
district whose lines resemble a plate of spaghetti.241

Conclusion
The vote dilution index is designed to permit a district-specific
assessment of the degree to which the decisions of mapmakers have
diminished the voting power of voters within a district, and we dare say it
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237. See Ingraham, supra note 193.
238. In other cases, the lines may have been drawn to promote minority representation under
the Voting Rights Act, a goal which, while laudable, may have the same anticompetitive effect on
a statewide map as methods designed to affirmatively diminish the voting power of minorities
within particular districts. See Clyde Haberman, The Odd Political Alliance Behind Today’s
Gerrymandering, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/28/us/30retrogerrymandering-districts.html.
239. Cohn & Bui, supra note 120.
240. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930 (2018); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 298
(2004) (plurality opinion) (“[P]acking and cracking, whether intentional or no, are quite consistent
with adherence to compactness and respect for political subdivision lines.”); Grofman & King,
supra note 3, at 28 (“Criteria such as compactness and respect for existing political boundaries are
often used as proxies for partisan gerrymandering, but they are typically not very good proxies. . . .
The fundamental issue in partisan gerrymandering cases in terms of effects is whether a districting
plan unfairly burdens the representational rights of a particular political group, not whether or not
districts look pretty.”); see also Boris Alexeev & Dustin G. Mixon, An Impossibility Theorem for
Gerrymandering, ARXIV (Oct. 26, 2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1710.04193.pdf (demonstrating that
it is mathematically impossible to achieve both optimal compactness and optimal efficiency while
maintaining equal population in any redistricting scheme).
241. See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1930; see also Beckett Mufson, ‘Spawn of Gerrymander’
Illustrates the Grotesque Shapes of US Congressional Districts, VICE (Nov. 3, 2014),
https://creators.vice.com/en_us/article/z4qmyj/spawn-of-gerrymander-illustrates-the-grotesqueshapes-of-us-congressional-districts.
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does just that.242 But the results demonstrate just how profound an impact
partisan gerrymandering has on the power of voters in the United States
today.
Were maps across the country drawn to maximize the
competitiveness of elections, then 117 million more people would live in
competitive Congressional districts than do today.243 Those voters reside in
310 of the nation’s 435 Congressional districts.
That is not to say, of course, that all 310 of those districts have been
drawn intentionally to disenfranchise voters.244 Nor does it mean that
maximal competitiveness is a constitutionally mandated norm, or that the
degree of gerrymandering in those 310 districts has reached a
constitutionally unacceptable level. Rather, it serves to illustrate just how
important it is that plaintiffs who would seek to challenge partisan
gerrymandering have the tools they need to establish standing so that they
may raise such challenges. Although we are not so bold to claim that the
vote dilution index, standing alone, provides a complete standard for
declaring any particular gerrymander unconstitutional, it does allow
plaintiffs to demonstrate both the degree to which their diminished voting
power is traceable to the decisions of mapmakers and how that injury can be
redressed.245 As the Court reminded us in Whitford, that is a necessary first
step before partisan gerrymandering can truly have its day in court.246
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See supra Part III.C.
See supra notes 190, 199 and accompanying text.
See supra note 3.
See supra Part II.A.
See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1930.
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Appendix
Table 1. Nonzero Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional District,
Ranked247
Rank

State

Dist.

1

NC

9

Favored
Party
Rep.

2

NC

4

Dem.

100

3

CA

22

Rep.

100

4

CA

4

Rep.

100

5
6
7

CA
MO
VA

8
1
3

Rep.
Dem.
Dem.

100
100
100

8

MO

2

Rep.

100

9

CO

2

Dem.

100

10

NY

22

Rep.

100

11

NY

26

Dem.

100

12

NY

20

Dem.

100

13

KY

6

Rep.

100

14

NY

23

Rep.

100

15

NJ

12

Dem.

100

16

MD

1

Rep.

100

17

NY

27

Rep.

100

18

PA

18

Dem.

100

19

PA

9

Rep.

100

20

NC

6

Rep.

100

21

KY

3

Dem.

100

22

NY

25

Dem.

100

23

VA

7

Rep.

100

VDI
100

CO

3

Rep.

100

25

OH

9

Dem.

100

26

NJ

4

Rep.

100

27

CA

1

Rep.

100

12/07/2018 13:09:16

247 Where two districts have the same vote dilution index, we have assigned a higher rank to
the district with the higher absolute number of voters who could have been drawn into a competitive
district on a maximally competitive map.
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Rank

State

Dist.

28

MI

12

Favored
Party
Dem.

29

IN

1

Dem.

100

30

MI

7

Rep.

100

31

NC

2

Rep.

100

32

NC

12

Dem.

100

33

CO

7

Dem.

100

34

IN

7

Dem.

100

35

FL

10

Dem.

100

36

ME

1

Dem.

100

37

WI

4

Dem.

100

38

CA

6

Dem.

100

39

GA

2

Dem.

100

40

NV

2

Rep.

100

41

CA

23

Rep.

100

42

TX

7

Rep.

100

43

CA

16

Dem.

100

44

IL

11

Dem.

100

45

IL

14

Rep.

100

46

NV

1

Dem.

100

47

TX

9

Dem.

100

48

TX

18

Dem.

100

49

TX

29

Dem.

100

50

FL

14

Dem.

99.9

51

WI

5

Rep.

99.9

52

FL

26

Dem.

99.9

53

VA

1

Rep.

99.9

54

VA

4

Dem.

99.9

55

NM

2

Rep.

99.8

56

TX

22

Rep.

99.7

57

PA

4

Dem.

99.5

58

CA

50

Rep.

99.3

59

CA

42

Rep.

98.8

60

TN

5

Dem.

98.6

[Vol. 46:2
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Rank

State

61

MN

6

Favored
Party
Rep.

62

PA

14

Rep.

97.7

63

TX

21

Rep.

96.3

64

TX

32

Rep.

96.0

65

FL

6

Rep.

95.9

66

MN

1

Rep.

95.4

67

NM

3

Dem.

93.9

68

TX

14

Rep.

93.4

69

GA

6

Rep.

92.8

70

OH

14

Rep.

92.7

71

PA

12

Rep.

92.4

72

NC

7

Rep.

92.1

73

TX

6

Rep.

92.0

74

PA

5

Dem.

91.6

75

FL

5

Dem.

91.5

76

OH

16

Rep.

91.4

Dist.

437

VDI
98.5

8

Dem.

90.1

TX

20

Dem.

90.1

79

CA

9

Dem.

90.0

80

NJ

6

Dem.

89.6

81

FL

15

Rep.

89.5

82

MO

5

Dem.

89.4

83

IL

16

Rep.

89.3

84

NC

1

Dem.

88.8

85

TX

2

Rep.

88.8

86

WI

1

Rep.

88.6

87

VA

5

Rep.

88.5

88

NC

8

Rep.

88.2

89

MD

2

Dem.

87.8

90

VA

6

Rep.

86.5

91

OH

15

Rep.

86.2

92

VA

11

Dem.

86.2

93

LA

2

Dem.

86.1

12/07/2018 13:09:16

IL

78

40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 79 Side A

77

40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 79 Side B

12/07/2018 13:09:16

FINNERAN_USE THIS ONE FINAL 12.7.18 (DO NOT DELETE)

438

12/7/2018 10:40 AM

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

94

MI

5

Favored
Party
Dem.

95

TX

31

Rep.

85.6

96

PA

10

Rep.

85.6

97

CA

31

Dem.

84.8

98

NY

17

Dem.

83.5

99

TX

28

Dem.

82.0

100

IN

4

Rep.

81.5

101

MD

6

Dem.

80.8

Rank

State

Dist.

[Vol. 46:2

VDI
85.8

102

IL

12

Rep.

80.6

103

TX

34

Dem.

80.2

104

OR

1

Dem.

79.7

105

WA

5

Rep.

79.6

106

CT

4

Dem.

79.0

107

WA

6

Dem.

78.9

108

IN

2

Rep.

77.8

109

GA

12

Rep.

77.5

2

Dem.

76.2

OK

5

Rep.

75.3

112

MA

6

Dem.

74.5

113

PA

11

Rep.

74.2

114

MO

3

Rep.

74.1

115

OH

6

Rep.

73.9

116

TX

12

Rep.

73.8

117

NC

5

Rep.

73.8

118

TX

27

Rep.

73.0

119

IL

3

Dem.

72.5

120

OH

4

Rep.

72.5

121

TX

24

Rep.

72.4

122

MI

3

Rep.

72.0

123

GA

7

Rep.

71.0

124

FL

16

Rep.

70.5

125

TX

30

Dem.

70.1

126

CA

24

Dem.

70.1

12/07/2018 13:09:16
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127

IN

5

Favored
Party
Rep.

128

FL

12

Rep.

69.2

129

MA

4

Dem.

68.9

130

FL

22

Dem.

68.8

131

FL

2

Rep.

68.1

132

PA

3

Dem.

67.7

133

MD

5

Dem.

67.2

134

WI

6

Rep.

66.7

135

OH

7

Rep.

66.5

136

FL

3

Rep.

65.4

137

WI

7

Rep.

64.9

138

AL

7

Dem.

64.9

139

IL

10

Dem.

64.3

140

WI

8

Rep.

64.3

141

GA

1

Rep.

64.3

142

MD

3

Dem.

63.0

Rank

State

Dist.

439

VDI
70.0

4

Rep.

62.7

NC

13

Rep.

62.5

145

FL

11

Rep.

61.5

146

MS

3

Rep.

61.5

147

NC

10

Rep.

61.4

148

AZ

6

Rep.

61.2

149

TX

17

Rep.

61.1

150

GA

10

Rep.

61.0

151

LA

1

Rep.

60.6

152

KS

4

Rep.

60.0

153

SC

2

Rep.

59.7

154

AL

6

Rep.

59.5

155

TX

5

Rep.

59.4

156

PA

15

Rep.

59.4

157

TX

10

Rep.

58.7

158

GA

8

Rep.

58.6

159

MN

4

Dem.

58.3

12/07/2018 13:09:16
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160

CO

4

Favored
Party
Rep.

161

CA

47

Dem.

56.9

162

GA

11

Rep.

56.5

163

WA

2

Dem.

56.5

164

SC

6

Dem.

55.1

165

MO

6

Rep.

54.0

166

SC

1

Rep.

53.7

167

TN

8

Rep.

53.5

168

CA

52

Dem.

53.4

169

UT

4

Rep.

52.5

170

AR

2

Rep.

52.3

171

TX

36

Rep.

52.0

172

IL

18

Rep.

51.2

173

TX

25

Rep.

50.2

174

OH

3

Dem.

50.1

175

MI

2

Rep.

49.6

176

CA

26

Dem.

49.6

177

FL

4

Rep.

49.4

178

TX

3

Rep.

48.7

179

TN

9

Dem.

48.3

180

TX

35

Dem.

47.9

181

AL

3

Rep.

47.9

182

IN

9

Rep.

47.7

183

MO

4

Rep.

45.6

184

CA

53

Dem.

45.3

185

MI

10

Rep.

44.8

186

MA

2

Dem.

44.6

187

CA

38

Dem.

44.5

188

GA

3

Rep.

44.2

189

CO

5

Rep.

44.0

190

OH

5

Rep.

44.0

191

TX

33

Dem.

42.6

192

TN

4

Rep.

42.6

Rank

State

Dist.

[Vol. 46:2
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Rank

State

193

MN

5

Favored
Party
Dem.

194

CA

2

Dem.

42.0

195

MA

3

Dem.

41.6

196

UT

2

Rep.

40.2

197

WA

1

Dem.

39.6

198

CA

33

Dem.

37.7

199

KS

2

Rep.

37.4

200

CA

41

Dem.

37.1

201

WA

10

Dem.

36.9

202

AR

1

Rep.

36.6

203

MO

7

Rep.

36.3

204

FL

17

Rep.

36.0

205

MA

8

Dem.

35.4

206

MD

7

Dem.

35.2

207

LA

3

Rep.

33.4

208

CA

27

Dem.

33.4

209

NY

10

Dem.

33.1

210

MD

8

Dem.

32.0

211

MD

4

Dem.

31.9

212

TX

26

Rep.

31.9

213

FL

21

Dem.

31.4

214

OH

12

Rep.

30.9

215

WA

4

Rep.

30.7

216

OH

13

Dem.

28.9

217

OH

11

Dem.

28.2

218

PA

2

Dem.

27.8

219

AL

2

Rep.

27.6

220

GA

5

Dem.

27.5

221

SC

5

Rep.

27.1

222

CT

1

Dem.

26.8

223

GA

4

Dem.

26.3

224

OK

4

Rep.

26.1

225

TN

7

Rep.

26.1

Dist.

441
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Rank

State

Dist.

226

MI

14

Favored
Party
Dem.

227

IN

6

Rep.

24.8

228

GA

13

Dem.

24.5

229

RI

1

Dem.

24.5

230

TX

15

Dem.

24.5

231

NY

8

Dem.

24.2

232

NY

9

Dem.

24.1

233

IL

2

Dem.

23.9

234

CA

28

Dem.

23.6

235

CA

5

Dem.

23.4

236

OH

8

Rep.

22.8

237

CA

15

Dem.

22.8

238

IL

1

Dem.

22.6

239

CA

35

Dem.

22.5

240

OH

2

Rep.

22.4

241

CT

3

Dem.

22.3

[Vol. 46:2

VDI
25.8

3

Rep.

21.5

CA

32

Dem.

21.4

244

LA

6

Rep.

21.4

245

AZ

7

Dem.

21.1

246

VA

9

Rep.

20.6

247

FL

20

Dem.

20.1

248

MA

1

Dem.

20.1

249

OR

3

Dem.

19.6

250

NC

3

Rep.

19.4

251

NC

11

Rep.

19.0

252

MS

2

Dem.

18.8

253

TX

11

Rep.

18.6

254

NY

16

Dem.

16.1

255

CA

46

Dem.

15.4

256

CO

1

Dem.

15.3

257

FL

19

Rep.

15.2

258

CA

43

Dem.

14.6
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259

WI

2

Favored
Party
Dem.

260

UT

3

Rep.

14.5

261

CA

11

Dem.

14.4

262

NY

7

Dem.

14.2

263

MS

1

Rep.

13.9

264

IL

9

Dem.

13.8

265

MN

7

Rep.

13.2

266

CA

19

Dem.

12.9

267

MA

5

Dem.

12.6

268

NJ

1

Dem.

12.0

269

VA

8

Dem.

12.0

270

TX

4

Rep.

11.9

271

MI

13

Dem.

11.1

272

NJ

9

Dem.

10.9

273

PA

13

Rep.

10.9

274

TN

6

Rep.

10.3

275

AR

4

Rep.

10.2

276

IL

5

Dem.

9.1

277

NM

1

Dem.

8.8

278

IL

15

Rep.

8.0

279

AZ

8

Rep.

8.0

280

TX

16

Dem.

7.6

281

NJ

10

Dem.

7.6

282

SC

7

Rep.

7.3

283

AZ

3

Dem.

6.8

284

TX

8

Rep.

6.8

285

MS

4

Rep.

5.9

286

AZ

5

Rep.

5.7

287

AZ

4

Rep.

5.6

288

FL

24

Dem.

5.6

289

NE

1

Rep.

5.2

290

KS

1

Rep.

5.2

291

NJ

8

Dem.

4.9

Rank

State

Dist.
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292

IL

4

Favored
Party
Dem.

293

NY

6

Dem.

3.7

294

PA

16

Rep.

3.4

295

CA

20

Dem.

2.8

296

CA

44

Dem.

2.3

297

GA

9

Rep.

2.3

298

NY

5

Dem.

2.2

299

AL

4

Rep.

1.3

300

FL

23

Dem.

1.0

301

MO

8

Rep.

0.5

302

CA

29

Dem.

0.4

303

CA

51

Dem.

0.4

304

FL

1

Rep.

0.3

305

CA

30

Dem.

0.3

306

LA

5

Rep.

0.3

307

CA

18

Dem.

0.2

308

CA

17

Dem.

0.1

309

WA

9

Dem.

0.1

310

FL

8

Rep.

0.1

Rank

State

Dist.
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Table 2. Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts,
Ranked
100
90

Vote Dilution Index

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1

51

101

151

201
251
Rank

301

351

401

Table 3. Nonzero Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional
Districts, Ranked by Party

100
90
80
Vote Dilution Index

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0

20

40

60

160
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Table 4. Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts,
Ranks 1í75
Vote Dilution Index

100
98
96
94
92
90
1

11

21

31

41

51

61

71

Rank
Safe Democratic District

Safe Republican District

Table 5. Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts,
Ranks 76í150
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
76

86

96

106

116

126

136

Rank
Safe Democratic District

Safe Republican District

146
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Table 6. Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts,
Ranks 151í225
Vote Dilution Index

65
55
45
35
25
151

161

171

181

191
201
211
Rank
Safe Democratic District
Safe Republican District

221

Table 7. Vote Dilution Indices of U.S. Congressional Districts,
Ranks 226í300
Vote Dilution Index

30
25
20
15
10
5
0
226

236

246

256

266
276
286
Rank
Safe Democratic District
Safe Republican District

249

State

VDI

Neg.
VDI248

Net
VDI249

1

NC

77.3

-

77.3

2

NM

66.1

-

66.1

3

VA

63.3

-

63.3

4

MO

62.5

-

62.5

5

MD

62.2

-

62.2

6

WI

62.0

-

62.0

See supra notes 169, 182, 187.
See supra notes 169, 182, 187.
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Rank

State

VDI

Neg.
VDI250

Net
VDI251

7

CO

60.0

2.1

58.0

8

TX

58.7

-

58.4

9

IN

55.6

-

55.6

10

OH

50.8

2.0

48.7

11

PA

50.5

6.3

44.2

12

GA

50.5

-

50.5

13

RI

50.4

-

50.4

14

NV

50.2

-

50.2

15

ME

50.0

-

50.0

16

FL

42.2

1.3

40.9

17

IL

40.0

1.7

38.3

18

MI

39.3

3.8

35.5

19

MN

38.2

1.0

37.2

20

KY

33.7

-

33.7

21

LA

33.7

-

33.7

22

TN

33.3

-

33.3

23

MA

32.7

-

32.7

24

CA

32.5

-

31.9

25

WA

32.3

2.3

30.0

26

NY

29.7

0.2

29.5

27

SC

28.9

-

28.9

28

AL

28.8

-

28.8

29

NJ

27.0

2.1

24.9

30

UT

26.8

-

26.8

31

KS

25.6

0.4

25.2

32

CT

25.2

5.9

19.3

33

MS

25.0

-

25.0

34

AR

24.9

-

24.9

35

OK

20.2

-

20.2

36

OR

19.5

0.2

19.3

37

AZ

12.1

1.9

10.2

See supra notes 169, 182, 187.
See supra notes 169, 182, 187.
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Rank

State

VDI

Neg.
VDI252

Net
VDI253

38

NE

1.8

1.6

0.2

39

HI

-

-

0

39

IA

-

-

0

39

ID

-

-

0

39

NH

-

-

0

39

WV

-

-

0

39

AK

-

-

0

39

DE

-

-

0

39

MT

-

-

0

39

ND

-

-

0

39

SD

-

-

0

39

WY

-

-

0

39

VT

-

-

0
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